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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Parties 
This marks the fifth appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in seven different cases filed by 
Reed and Donna Taylor (herein referred to as "Reed" and "Donna")1 in an attempt to redeem 
their shares in AIA Services Corporation ("AIA").2 Additionally, two cases have been filed in 
federal court regarding this issue, one case is pending in Washington's state court, and Donna 
made an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in a California proceeding. The current matter is an 
interlocutory appeal in relation to two lawsuits filed by Donna, both of which seek redemption 
payments for the Series A Preferred shares in AIA she received as de facto alimony at the time of 
her divorce from Reed in 1987. 
Donna's initial Complaint (in which Reed was not named as a defendant) against John 
Taylor ("John") (CV 08-01150) sought to enforce a letter signed by Reed and John in which 
Donna agreed to defer five of her monthly redemption payments in return for Reed and John's 
personal guarantee of those five payments. Repeated amendments to that Complaint named 
Connie Taylor Henderson ("Connie") as a defendant while alleging additional claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty, false representations, fraud, constructive fraud, constructive trust, and unjust 
enrichment. In response, John, and Connie asserted a number of affirmative defenses and 
1 Some parties' first names will be used in an effort to avoid confusion as multiple parties have the last name of 
"Taylor" or a variation thereof. 
2 Taylor v. McNichols and Taylor v. Babbitt (consolidated), 149 Idaho 826,243. P.3d 642 (2010); Taylor v. A/A 
Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011), Taylor v. Riley and Taylor v. Eberle Berlin (consolidated), 157 
Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256 (2014) and Taylor v. Riley 11,just decided at S. Ct. Docket No. 43686-2015. 
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counterclaimed for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and abuse of process. 3 Donna filed 
another suit naming three new defendants: James Beck, ("Beck"), Michael Cashman 
("Cashman"/ and AIA while keeping the same claims as listed above. 
Ultimately, the overarching issue in this appeal is whether the interest rate on AIA's 
redemption of Donna's remaining Series A preferred shares is prime less 1 Yz% or whether it is 
prime plus V-i%. It is the respondents' and cross-appellants' position that District Court correctly 
ruled that the applicable interest rate is prime less 1. Yz %. As a result, Donna has 7,110 of 
remaining shares in AIA eligible for redemption, in the event AIA has the funds to redeem those 
shares without violating Idaho law. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AIA was founded in 1983 by Reed and Donna. (R. 475.) However, their relationship 
deteriorated and in 1987 Donna and Reed entered into a Property Settlement Agreement as a part 
of their divorce settlement. (R. 532-600.) In that agreement Donna and Reed contributed their 
ownership interests in AIA in exchange for 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock and 5,963 
shares of common stock, respectively. This effectively diverted funds from AIA to pay Reed's 
alimony. (R. 532-600.) Pursuant to that agreement, AIA's Articles of Incorporation ("1987 
Articles") were amended by AIA shareholders to include the redemption of Donna's shares at an 
interest rate of prime less 1 Yz %. (R. 2446, Article 4.5.) Additionally, the 1987 Articles state 
3 Donna's Third Amended Complaint in CV 08-01150 has not been litigated because it was filed shortly before the 
trial court granted AIA's motion for summary judgment that led to this appeal. 
4 John, Connie, James Beck, and Michael Cashman, when referred to together will herein be referred to as 
"defendants'' while James Beck and Michael Cashman individually will be herein referred to as "Beck" and 
"Cashman" respectively. 
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that the redemption of Donna's shares could only be made " ... from legally available funds ... 
but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporations Act 
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." (R. 2445, Article 4.3(a).) 
Furthermore, the 1987 Articles state that AIA may elect to redeem shares via installment 
payments in lieu of a lump sum. (R. 2446, Article 4.6(b).) During this time Reed was the 
majority shareholder, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of AIA. (R. 30.) In 1989 AIA's Articles 
were amended again and added Article 12 which allowed AIA to purchase its own shares to the 
extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus. (R. 680-81.) 
In December 1992, Donna informed AIA that she wished to redeem her shares in the 
corporation. (R. 14, paragraph 14.) Both parties entered into an agreement to redeem Donna's 
shares at $10.00 per share over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of prime less 11/z %. (R. 14, 
paragraph 14.) Subsequently, AIA began redeeming Donna's shares per that agreement. (R. 
808.) However, after entering into that agreement, AIA suffered enormous losses with Reed at 
the helm; according to CPA Paul Pederson, a total of $15,993,795 was written off in 1994 and 
1995 due to losses associated with the Universe Life Insurance Company5 (R. 2030) coupled 
with Reed's general mismanagement of AIA, extravagant personal spending, and his diversion of 
AIA funds to pay his alimony. (R. 3545.) By 1995, AIA had an earned deficit of $(18,760,127), a 
total stockholder's deficit of $(17,018,838), an operating loss of $(84,479), and negative net 
income of $(10,650,150). (R. 2030.) This led to AIA's default on its redemption agreement with 
Donna. 
5 The Universal Life Insurance Company was, at the time, a direct subsidiary of AJA. 
3 
RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN REPLY -
Reed's terrible mismanagement of AIA left its future as a profitable entity anything but 
certain and AIA was left in financial ruin. (R. 2030; 3509-53.) During this tumultuous time, AIA 
sought to reorganize through a multi-faceted Reorganization Plan which included terms 
negotiated via letters between Donna's counsel and AIA to accelerate the redemption of her 
shares at a higher interest rate of prime plus ll,i % (herein called the "1995 Letters.") (R. 3509-53; 
1259; 3481; 438-440; - 440-46; - 448-449 - ) These letters discussed revising the amortization 
schedule and increasing the interest rate of AIA'S redemption of Donna's shares in AIA to prime 
plus ll,i %. (R. 438; 442; 448.)6 At a special shareholder's meeting held on March 7, 1995, the 
change in Donna's redemption terms as a part of AIA's Reorganization Plan was presented. (R. 
3485 - 3505.) That plan was adopted; however the resolutions and agreement contained therein 
were contingent on upon the closing of a Private Placement of Series B Preferred Stock, Series C 
Preferred Stock, and Warrants in AIA. (R. 3512-14.) It was also during this time that R. John 
Taylor ("John"), James Beck ("Beck"), and Michael Cashman ("Cashman"), became majority 
shareholders in AIA. Reed stepped aside as CEO ( although he remained on the Board of 
Directors as a Director of AIA through 2001). (R. 1957, 2225-38, 970-976.) As a result of the 
meeting on March 7, 1995, AIA shareholders adopted Articles of Amendment and although a 
change to Donna's redemption terms was discussed, those articles maintained the prime less 1 Yz 
% interest rate for Donna's redemption. (R. 688.) Ultimately, the Reorganization Plan was not 
consummated because AIA Services failed to raise the necessary funds through private 
placement. Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552,557,261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
6 These letters were correspondence between Donna's divorce attorney, Cumer Green, a CPA (R. 3524) and member 
ofthe AJA Board of Directors in 1994 and 1995 and AIA. (R. 975, 976.) 
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In July 1996, Donna entered into a Preferred Shareholders Agreement ("PSA") with Reed 
and AIA. (R. 451-59.) Concurrently, AIA, Reed, and Donna entered into a Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement ("SRA.") (R. 149.). The PSA increased Donna's interest rate on AIA's 
redemption of her shares to prime plus ll,i%, and provided that Reed's right to payment on the 
sums owed to him under the SRA was subordinated to Donna's redemption of her Series A 
shares. (R. 454). 7 The PSA, which was signed by Donna, Reed, and AIA, also stated, "No 
provision of this agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or supplemented, except by a 
writing signed by all parties to this agreement." (R. 458.) Under these agreements, AIA paid 
Donna $2,696,797.80 and Reed $9,709,367 in cash, along with equity in AIA assets and debt 
forgiveness. (R. 2376; 3348-50.) Subsequently, Reed's SRA was deemed illegal and 
unenforceable based on then controlling Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Taylor at 574-5. Futher, the 
parties in this case have agreed that Donna's 1996 PSA is illegal and unenforceable for the same 
reasons discussed in the Taylor case. 
In an effort to keep itself afloat, AIA elected to move in a different direction and as a 
result formed Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA"). (R. 627.) In order to obtain the 
necessary funding to do this, AIA and Reed sought Donna's approval to defer five (5) of its 
redemption payments to her. (R. 627.) However, by 2006, redemption payments to Reed and 
Donna from AIA had exhausted the company. (R. 2376.) In response, Reed and Donna 
clandestinely entered into an agreement to reverse the subordination clauses contained in the 
PSA and SRA, giving Reed redemption priority over Donna. (R. 461.) Neither Reed nor Donna 
7 The Letter Agreements which Donna seeks to enforce also provided for Reed's debt to be subordinated to the 
redemption of her Series A Shares. (R. 602.) 
RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN REPLY -
5 
informed AIA of this arrangement and AIA paid Donna $175,000 to which she was not entitled, 
based on Reed and Donna's hidden agreement. (R. 2376; 2794.) By 2008 AIA could no longer 
sustain itself while paying Donna and Reed. (R. 2376.) 
In order to keep AIA a going concern, it stopped making payments to Reed and Donna. 
Taylor at 558; (R. 633.) As a result, Reed brought suit against AIA. See Generally, Taylor v. AJA 
Servs. Corp. 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). Ultimately, it was found that Reed's 1996 
SRA was in violation of Idaho state law and thus, was invalid and unenforceable. Taylor at 574-
75. In response, AIA continued to forestall making redemption payments to Donna because 
further payments under an illegal agreement would open up AIA to legal action from minority 
shareholders. 
Essentially, the initial terms for the redemption of Donna's shares are contained in AIA's 
1987 Articles; prime less 1 Yi%. Additionally, under both the law and the express terms of the 
1987 Articles, Donna is entitled to redemption of her remaining 7,110 shares only from "legally 
available funds" to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporations 
Act restrictions on the AIA' s redemption of its own shares. 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
June 2, 2008, Donna filed her first Complaint against John for the redemption of her 
shares in AIA and other claims. (R. 136-39.) That complaint was amended and filed to include 
Connie Taylor Henderson as a defendant. (R. 159-66.) In response, John and Connie filed a 
counterclaim, however, a ruling in that case was stayed due to this Court's then pending decision 
in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P .3d 829 (2011) (R. 167-77.) 
6 
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At issue in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al. was whether the District Court erred when 
it dismissed six of Reed's causes of action based on Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (1995). Taylor at 556. 
This Court ruled that the SRA entered into by Reed and AIA in 1996 was illegal and 
unenforceable pursuant to LC. § 30-1-6, as that code required AIA to use earned surplus and not 
capital surplus when redeeming Reed's shares in the company. Id. Based on that decision, all 
parties agreed that the 1996 PSA entered into by Donna and AIA was also illegal. (R. 1058-59.) 
Accordingly, John and Connie moved for partial summary judgment claiming Donna's stock 
redemption was illegal and unenforceable. (R. 405-16.) In response, Donna argued that AIA 
could use its capital surplus to redeem her shares based on the Letter Agreements exchanged 
between the parties in 1995 and not the 1996 PSA. (R. 503-24.) Ultimately, John and Connie's 
motion was denied and the stay was lifted. (R. 1009-14.) 
On May 24, 2013, Donna filed a second suit against John, Connie, AIA, James Beck, and 
Cashman for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment. (R. 11-25.) 
In response, AIA filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting Donna breached the 1996 SRA by 
entering into a subordination agreement with Reed, unbeknownst to AIA. (R. 54-63.) In the 
interest of efficacy, the District Court consolidated both suits. (R. 64-73.) On March 17, 2014, 
AIA filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. (R. 1032-89; 1190-1213 .) In response, 
Donna filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the 1995 Letter Agreements 
were legal and AIA had authorization to use capital surplus at that time to redeem her remaining 
shares. (R. 2049-2308.) 
7 
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On July 14, 2014, the District Court granted both motions in part, ruling: Donna's claims 
of fraud and fiduciary duty were barred by the Economic Loss Rule; she failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted for unjust enrichment; the 1996 SRA was illegal; the 1995 
Letter Agreements were valid and enforceable and that Donna owned 41,509.69 shares in AIA. 
(R. 2413-30.) Subsequently, both parties filed motions for reconsideration and the court later 
ruled that Donna's breach of fiduciary duty claims were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule. 
(R. 2601-10.) In response, AIA filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the number of 
shares held by Donna was 7,110 and on June 15, 2015, the court ruled in AIA's favor. (R. 3346-
51.) 
In support of that motion, John and Connie supplied the court with uncontroverted 
evidence that AIA shareholders had not voted to amend the interest rate for redemption of 
Donna's shares contained in AIA's 1987 Articles. (R. 3346-3351.) Based on that evidence, and 
this Court's ruling in the Taylor case, the court ruled that the 1995 Letter Agreements were 
unenforceable and as a result, the applicable interest rate regarding the redemption of Donna's 
shares in AIA was prime less 1 Yz % as stated in the 1987 Articles. (R. 3346-51.) Additionally, 
based on that ruling, AIA had successfully redeemed all but 7,110 of Donna's shares when the 
redemption payments to Donna were reamortized at the lower rate. (R. 3350.) Further, that court 
issued a judgment dismissing, with prejudice, the following claims made by Donna: breach of 
contract; fraud; aiding and abetting fraud; and unjust enrichment. (R. 3346-51.) 
On July 21, 2015, Donna filed a third amended complaint in her first suit. (R. 3367-77.) 
In response, John and Connie answered that third amended complaint and counterclaimed with 
8 
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claims of abuse of process and unjust enrichment. (R. 3378-88.) On September 8, 2016, the 
District court issued a Rule 54(b) judgment based on its prior rulings and Donna moved to 
amend that judgment. (R. 3442-64.) That motion was denied on December 28, 2016. (R. 3806.) 
In response, Donna appealed and John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman cross-appealed. (R. 3805-
59.) 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna's claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty against the Defendants are not barred by the economic 
loss rule? 
2. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna's reverse subordination 
agreement was not a breach of contract? 
3. Are the respondents entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees 
on appeal? 
V. ARGUMENT 
This Cross-Appeal and reply arises from the District Court's decisions on motions for 
summary judgment and motions for reconsideration. (R. 2413-30; 2601-10; 3346-51; 3802-04.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the District Court's rulings on motions for summary judgment this Court 
uses the same standard of review as the District Court. Frangella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 
271 (2012). Although evidence is looked upon in favor of the non-moving party, if all available 
evidence in the record shows there is no issue of genuine material fact, then the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Additionally, when considering a motion for 
reconsideration which follows a motion for summary judgment, this Court " ... must determine 
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whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id 
at 276. Thus, the summary judgment standard is used by this Court in reviewing a District 
Court's decision on summary judgment and motion for reconsideration. Id. Meaning, this Court 
reviews a denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo. Shea v. Kevic Corp., l 56 Idaho 540, 
545 (2014). 
1. The court should dismiss all claims/arguments that go beyond the scope of the District 
Court's IRCP 54(b) Judgment, are not supported by the record, are unsupported by 
cogent argument and authority, or seek advisory opinions. 
The majority of Donna's appellate brief is comprised of unproven allegations relevant 
only to her claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, or 
her request that this Court impose the alter ego doctrine. However, none of these claims are a 
part of the IRCP 54(b) Judgment and may not be considered on appeal. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 558. 
These allegations have never been adjudicated and have been consistently denied. Through her 
appeal, Donna seeks appellate review without ever having proven her claims through admissible 
evidence (as opposed to declarations of her counsel). 
The Defendants also ask that this Court disregard the many arguments throughout 
Donna's brief that acknowledge she is going beyond the record and in which the error 
complained of is not identified or the issue is not supported by cogent argument and authority. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). To the extent AIA and the individuals are able, issues raised by 
Donna which rely on evidence outside of the record or are unsupported by cogent argument, are 
addressed throughout this cross-appeal and reply. 
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A. Donna's demand for a new judge on remand is improper. 
Donna's demand that this Court assign a new District Court judge on remand is improper. 
The case cited, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012), 
is one in which the appellate court reviewed the propriety of a judge's denial of a Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause. In this case, there is no such issue and Donna's argument is simply a 
request for a purely advisory opinion, which the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized it is not 
empowered to issue. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 569, citing MDS Invs., L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456, 
464-65, 65 P.3d 197, 205-06 (2003). 
2. The District Court was correct in ruling that Donna currently owns 7,110 shares in AIA 
based on prior redemption payments made by AIA and the 1987 Articles. 
A. The District Court correctly ruled that the Pref erred Shareholders 
Agreement entered into by AIA, Reed, and Donna is illegal an 
unenforceable. 
Contracts are interpreted based on their plain and ordinary meaning. Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 259 (2011). " ... corporate documents are equivalent to contracts ... the 
normal rules governing the interpretation of contracts apply." Twin Lakes Vil!. Prop. Ass 'n v. 
Aune, 124 Idaho 132 (1993 ). As such, "the determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect 
is a question of law when the contract is clear and unambiguous." Id. Additionally, an illegal and 
unenforceable contract is one in which the consideration provided violates a statute, law, or is 
contrary to public policy. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 564-65. Further, "where a statute intends to 
prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the 
inhibition or to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statue." Id. 
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In this case there is no question that the 1996 PSA entered into by AIA and Donna 
violated then existing Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Idaho Code § 30-1-6, now repealed, states that a 
corporation has the right to redeem its own shares in one of two ways: through the use of 
unrestricted earned available surplus if the articles of incorporation permit the use of that surplus 
or through the use of unrestricted capital surplus, but only if voted on and approved by the 
shareholders. LC. § 30-1-6 (1995). When AIA, Reed, and Donna entered into the PSA in July 
1996, AIA had no earned surplus and was not authorized to use capital surplus because its 
shareholders never explicitly voted in favor of its use to redeem either Reed or Donna's shares. 
Taylor at 560-62. Therefore, Donna's PSA is illegal and unenforceable, just as Reed's SRA was. 
B. The District Court was not required to determine whether the PSA was 
enforceable under any exception to the illegality doctrine. 
Donna argues, albeit incorrectly, that the District Court was required to determine 
whether the PSA should have been enforced via an exception to the afore-mentioned illegality 
doctrine. However, the District Court was not required to do so. It is true that a court has a duty 
to raise the issue of illegality of a contract sua sponte. Tress v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 
765, 768 (2002) There are three exceptions in which a court may grant relief to an innocent party 
based on the illegality of a contract: one, when public policy requires; two, if the parties are not 
in pari delicto or when fraud, undue influence or duress is present; and three, some relief is 
granted to insured who signed void insurance contracts, if unenforceable, would defeat the 
purpose of the statute. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 565; Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist.# 401, 
147 Idaho 277,287,207 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2009). However, "Courts on occasion, however, apply 
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an exception to the illegality doctrine ... " Trees at 9. 
When the court finds a contract to be illegal, it must leave the parties where the law finds 
them. Id. As such, the District Court, when ruling that Donna's PSA was illegal and 
unenforceable, was not required to determine whether the PSA was enforceable under any of the 
above-mentioned exceptions, (R. 3346-50.) Donna argues, for the first time in her brief, that the 
PSA was enforceable under the in pari delicto exception, and under the public policy exception; 
both of which are addressed in turn. 
C. The PSA is not enforceable under the in pari delicto exception to the 
illegality doctrine. 
A court may enforce an illegal contract when the parties are not in equal fault. Wernecke 
at 287. Donna seems to argue, disjointedly and convolutedly, that because she was not 
represented by counsel when she entered into the PSA, she is an innocent party. However, the 
Donna was represented by counsel, attorney Cumer Green, when entering into the 1995 letter 
agreements. (R. 602-625.) Further, Donna was advised to consult legal counsel prior to signing 
the PSA, which was a mere formality, based on the 1995 Letter Agreements, and voluntarily 
elected not to do so. (R. 622.) Thus, Donna's choice to not be represented by counsel when 
entering into the PSA is not a reason to enforce an illegal contract as her choice to be uninformed 
is insufficient to make her an innocent party to the PSA. See generally Taylor at 566. Donna also 
argues that because she lacks a secondary or formal education, this somehow grants her special 
status in regards to the enforcement of the illegal PSA. However, in rejecting this argument,this 
Court found "where a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, 
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without regard to the reason of the inhibition or to the ignorance of the parties as to the 
prohibiting statute." Taylor at 565. As such, Donna's ignorance of the law is irrelevant. 
Therefore, Donna's voluntary choice to not be represented by counsel when entering into the 
PSA and her ignorance of I.C. § 30-1-6 does not make her an innocent party to the agreement. 
Donna further argues that because John and Connie are, and were at the time AIA entered into 
the PSA, licensed attorneys they are presumed to have known that the PSA was illegal and as 
such are not innocent parties. However, John and Connie were not parties to the PSA, and did 
not represent AIA as agents or as counsel in their capacity as licensed attorneys when AIA and 
Donna entered into the PSA. (R. 623; 3476; 3485; 3524; 3554.) Thus, their status as attorneys is 
completely irrelevant. 
D. The PSA is not enforceable under the public policy exception to the 
illegality doctrine. 
Donna argues that in the event this Court does not agree that the PSA is enforceable, 
it should create a remedy for her under quantum meruit based on this Court's ruling in Farrell v. 
Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2008). " ... quantum meruit permits 
recovery, based on an implied promise to pay, of the reasonable value of the services rendered or 
the material provided." Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767, 
979 P.2d 627 (1999). In Farrell case, an architect was impliedly contracted and performed 
services under that contract both before and after being licensed as an architect in Idaho. Farrell 
at 608. As a result, this Court ruled that the District Court was correct in awarding the architect 
damages based on quantum meruit for services rendered after becoming licensed. However, this 
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case is unlike the Farrell case as Donna provided no services to AIA or the individual 
defendants. In fact, it was AIA who provided a benefit to Donna vis a vis Reed when AIA was 
essentially forced to make payments to her after both Reed and Donna entered into the Property 
Settlement Agreement that served as Reed's alimony settlement in their divorce. (R.946; 991; 
2256-57.) Thus, Donna has contributed no services to AIA or the individual defendants. In fact, 
she has been paid by AIA to the tune of over $2 million dollars. Therefore, any remedy based on 
quantum meruit is inapplicable. 
E. Donna's arguments and claims of breach of fiduciary duties should 
not be considered by this Court as they are claims outside the scope of 
this appeal. 
Additionally, Donna claims that John, Beck, and Cashman breached their fiduciary duties 
when they didn't hold a special shareholder meeting to specifically authorize the use of capital 
surplus to redeem her shares in AIA. However, it is important to note that Donna's claims of 
AIA directors' and officers' breach of fiduciary duties are not at issue in this appeal and should 
not be considered as these issues are beyond the scope of the Rule 54(b) certified judgment. 
Taylor at 558; (R. 3439.). However, if in the event this Court does address these issues, there is 
no merit to the argument that AIA officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders, including Donna. All parties to the PSA were under the impression that 
the PSA was legal based on the opinion of outside counsel hired by AIA. (R. 623; 3476; 3485; 
3524; 3554.) The use of in-house and outside counsel when entering into the PSA is indicative of 
AIA directors' and officers' commitment to AIA and its shareholders. 
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F. The District Court did not err when it did not sever illegal portions of the 
PSA in regards to Reed as doing so would have no effect on portions 
pertaining to Donna. 
Donna argues that this Court should sever the portions of the PSArelating to Reed and 
claims that this would then make the PSA valid and enforceable. In the event a transaction 
contains " ... both benign and offensive components and the different components are severable, 
the unobjectionable parts are generally enforceable." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611, 
200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2008). Rules permitting the enforcement of those unobjectionable parts are 
not invariably applicable. Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 426, 582 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1978). 
However, even if those portions relating to Reed were severed, Donna's PSA still violates LC. § 
30-1-6, making the provisions related to Donna illegal. During summary judgment, Donna, 
through counsel, agreed that the PSA was illegal for the same reason Reed's SRA was illegal. 
(R. 2425.); See Taylor, 151 Idaho at 567. 
In the Taylor case, this Court determined that LC.§ 30-1-6 was intended to prohibit the 
use of capital surplus by a corporation to redeem its shares unless authorized by the shareholders 
and to do so without that authorization would favor one shareholder at the expense of other 
shareholders and creditors. Id. Additionally, Donna acknowledges that the 1996 SRA entered 
into by Reed and AIA tainted her 1996 PSA with AIA, making her agreement illegal and 
unenforceable. (R. 2282.) Thus, even if this Court were to sever the portions of the PSA related 
to Reed, it would have no effect on the portions related to Donna as they are still illegal. 
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G. AIA, John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman may use I.C. § 30-1-6 as a 
legal and equitable defense because contracts involving consideration 
expressly prohibited by statute are void. 
Alternatively, Donna argues that this Court may enforce the illegal PSA because AIA, 
John, Beck, Cashman, and Connie were not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6 based on the 
Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321 (Col. 
1996). In that case, the defendant was a Florida corporation who became insolvent and as a 
result, a creditor demanded personal loan guarantees from Minnelusa shareholders. Minnelusa at 
1322. The shareholders refused to do so and the corporation entered into a stock repurchase 
agreement to buy out their shares. Id. Minnelusa defaulted on the repurchase agreement and the 
shareholders sued. Id. In response, Minnelusa argued that because it was insolvent, it could not 
repurchase the remaining shares pursuant to a Florida statute which prohibits an insolvent 
corporation from repurchasing its own stock. Id. The issue in that case was whether a corporation 
such as Minnelusa was the intended beneficiary of the Florida statute and the court ruled that it 
was not. Id. However, this Court has rejected the Minnelusa argument in the Taylor case. Taylor 
at 564. "[A] court of equity ... does not concern itself as to the manner in which the illegality of a 
matter before it is brought to its attention." Id. As a result, as this Court has already ruled that 
AIA, John, Beck, Cashman, and Connie may assert I.C. § 30-1-6 as a defense and the ruling in 
Minnelusa is inapplicable. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 564. 
Further, Donna argues that AIA may not disavow its obligation to her based on the ruling 
in La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45, 49 (1952). In that case, a former 
shareholder in a corporation sold his stock back to the corporation in return for a note and 
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mortgage. La Vay Supply at 124. The corporation became insolvent and could not continue to 
make payments on the note to the shareholder. Id. The La Voy Court ruled that a corporation 
itself cannot have a stock repurchase declared illegal. Id at 127. This Court specifically rejected 
this argument in the Taylor case, ruling "a court of equity ... does not concern itself as to the 
manner in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention." Taylor at 564. 
Thus, AIA, John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman may assert LC. § 30-1-6 as a defense. 
In both of the above-mentioned instances, the PSA should not be enforced. This Court 
has long recognized that although" ... consequences of a court finding a contract to be illegal are 
harsh, only those contracts which involve consideration that is expressly prohibited by the 
relevant prohibitory statute are void." Farrell at 609. In this case, at the time the PSA was 
entered into AIA had no earned surplus, it had no capital surplus, and there had not been 
shareholder approval to use capital surplus to redeem Donna's shares. (R. 2376.) This is exactly 
what is prohibited by the statute. Thus, the PSA is void and thus enforceable under LC. § 30-1-6. 
See Taylor at 564. 
Alternatively, Donna argues that shareholder approval was not needed to approve a 
change in the interest rate from prime less 1 Yz% to prime plus \/,i%. However, Donna supports 
this argument by stating she has found no authority that requires more than board approval of 
the change in interest rate based on Idaho Code§ 30-1-35 (repealed). This argument fails to take 
into consideration the fact the contract for AIA's redemption of Donna's shares is contained 
solely in AIA's 1987 Articles. Under LC.§ 30-1-1003 (recodified in 1995 as LC.§ 30-29-1003), 
once a corporation has issued shares, any amendment to the corporations Articles of 
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Incorporation must first be adopted by the board of directors, and then (with minor exceptions 
not applicable in the present case) the amendment must be submitted to the shareholders for their 
approval. I.C. § 30-29-1003. 
In addition, I.C. § 30-1-6 expressly states that in order for a corporation to redeem its 
shares it must do so from earned surplus or capital surplus provided that the corporation's 
shareholders have expressly authorized. I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) (repealed). This clearly states the 
requirements a corporation must adhere to in order to redeem its stock. Since the 1996 PSA is 
illegal and unenforceable because AIA had no earned surplus, nor did AIA have capital surplus 
and shareholder authorization to use that capital surplus, Donna and AIA are bound to the 1987 
Articles. 
H. The District Court did not err when it ruled that the recalculation and 
reamortization was a correct accounting of Donna's shares in AIA to 
date. 
Donna argues that the District Court erred when it relied on AIA's recalculation and 
reamortization of Donna's shares in AIA because she claims the figures contained therein are 
based on speculation. However, these figures were calculated by computer programmer and 
analyst Kenneth Goods, under oath, using TValue amortization software. (R. 1068.) Mr. Goods 
based these figures on the payments made to Donna at the appropriate interest rate of prime less 
1 Vi%. (R. 1068.) As of March 13, 2014, AIA had paid $2,776,458.25 to Donna and included the 
appropriate interest in the amount $776,458.25. (R. 1072-97.) Donna agreed that the appropriate 
interest rate to apply to AIA's redemption was an issue for the court to determine. (R. 3349.) 
Now, Donna wishes to appeal this amount simply because she does not agree with it. These 
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figures are not speculation and the court rightfully determined that the payments made to Donna 
redeemed all but 7, 110 shares in AIA. 
I. The District Court was correct in dismissing Donna's claim for breach 
of contract as she has failed to establish the existence of earned 
surplus or capital surplus, let alone AIA's solvency. 
To present a prima facie case that AIA has breached its duty to redeem her shares, Donna 
must prove that AIA could do so without violating the Idaho Business Corporations 
Act. However, she failed to present sufficient evidence to establish her claim, and as a result, the 
District Court correctly dismissed her breach of contract claim. (R. 3439.) 
This Court has determined that AIA had no earned surplus in 1995. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 
561. Additionally, Donna submitted no evidence to show that AIA had capital surplus at the time 
of the Letter Agreements. She has also failed to establish that AIA was solvent at the time of the 
Letter Agreements, which is a requirement for AIA to make a legal redemption of Donna's 
shares. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 569. Further, "No purchase or payment for its own shares shall be 
made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make 
it insolvent." LC. § 30-1-6 (repealed). 
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3. The District Court correctly left the parties where they were based on the 1987 Articles 
because the 1995 Letter Agreements were superseded by the 1996 Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement, which is illegal and unenforceable, and as a result so are the 
1995 Letters. 
A. There was no shareholder approval authorizing the increase in interest to 
be paid to Donna on the redemption of her preferred shares in AIA. 
Prior to its ruling on June 14, 2014, the District Court held that the 1995 Letters were 
enforceable as they could not be superseded by an illegal agreement. (R. 2426.) However, the 
District Court subsequently changed its ruling based on a motion to reconsider and new evidence 
presented. (R. 3349.) Ultimately, the court ruled that because there was no evidence of a 
shareholder vote authorizing the use of capital surplus or to increase the amount of interest paid 
on Donna's redemption, as discussed in the 1995 Letters, the parties were to be left where they 
stood in 1987 when AIA amended its Articles. (R. 3346-50.) 
This decision was based on the declaration of AIA Secretary JoLee Duclos and the 
reamortization of the redemption payments made by AIA to Donna up until May 2008. (R.3349; 
R. 1067-1189.) Ms. Duclos declared, under oath, that there was neither record of shareholders 
authorizing the use of capital surplus to redeem Donna's shares nor was there record of 
shareholder authorization to increase the amount of interest paid to Donna over the amortization 
period to prime plus 1/i% from prime less 1 Yi%. (R. 2708-09; 3349.) While Donna argues that 
Ms. Duclos committed perjury, to further substantiate the claims she made in her affidavit, Ms. 
Duclos provided the minutes from multiple corporate shareholder meetings implicitly showing 
AIA shareholder consensus that the interest rate of Donna's redemption was prime less 1 Yi%. 
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(R. 2710-20; 3349.) In light of this uncontroverted evidence, the court elected to reverse its prior 
holding, as is its right, based on a motion to reconsider. (R. 3346-50.) 
Donna also argues that AIA shareholders authorized the increase in interest on March 7, 
1995, when they approved the catch all phrase, "All other corporate actions necessary to 
recapitalize and reorganize the Company .. .in accordance with the reorganization plan approved 
by the Board of Directors." (R. 3505.) Donna believes that this, plus the elements listed in the 
Reorganization Plan which states the intended change in Donna's redemption terms, equals 
shareholder authorization of the interest rate and amortization period of her redemption. 
However, the Reorganization Plan, and its implementation were contingent upon AIA obtaining 
capital through private placement, which did not occur. (R. 3512-14.) 
B. Additionally, the 1995 Letters were replaced by the 1996 PSA and cannot 
be reanimated. 
Donna argues that the 1995 Letters were substituted by the 1996 PSA, and because the 1996 
PSA is illegal, the 1995 Letters should be enforced. However, a substituted contract is a contract 
that the obligee has accepted in satisfaction of an already existing duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 279(1). Further, a " ... substituted contract discharges the original duty and 
breach of the substituted contract by the obligor does not give the obligee a right to enforce the 
original duty." Id at (2). It is the case that if the substituted contract is voidable, then the original 
duty is enforceable upon avoidance. Id at cmt. b. However, this is only the case in the event that 
the contract is voidable due to " ... mistake, misrepresentation, duress or unconscionability ... " Id. 
None of those elements are present in this case. In fact, the 1996 SRA expressly states "This 
22 
RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN REPLY -
agreement supersedes and replaces the [1995] Letter Agreements in their entirety. The Letter 
Agreement shall hereafter have no further force or effect." Further, the plain language of the 
1996 PSA states; "Eberle Berlin and you [Donna's attorney] will mutually prepare a draft of a 
definitive settlement agreement incorporating the foregoing terms and other documents 
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement." (R. 604, page 4 of January 11, 1995 letter). 
Allowing Donna to exhume the 1995 Letters would force AIA to carry out an illegal contract. 
See Farrell v. Whiteman, 164 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009); (R. 3346-3351.) Therefore, the 
parties were left where the law found which means that all but 7, 110 of Donna's shares had been 
redeemed by AIA at the original interest rate of prime less 1 Vi%. 
C. The 1987 Articles are a valid and enforceable contract between Donna 
and AIA, the terms of which could not be adopted or modified without 
shareholder approval. 
Donna argues that the 1987 Articles represent a valid and enforceable contract between 
herself and AIA under which she and AIA may elect to modify at any time irrespective of 
shareholder approval or authorization. Donna relies on a District Court opinion in the southern 
District of Illinois in which that court ruled that redemption terms of preferred stock issues 
creates a contract between the corporation and the shareholder which is modifiable, simply 
because it is a contract. Franklin Life Ins.Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 415 F.Supp. 602, 
613 (D.C. Ill. 1978); Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v Larsen, 83 Idaho 290, 293, 362 P.2d 384, 384 
(1961 ). However, Donna fails to take into consideration that the contract which contains her 
redemption terms is contained in the 1987 Articles. As addressed above, under Idaho law once a 
shareholder's shares were issued, any amendments to the corporation's Articles of Incorporation 
23 
RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN REPLY -
must be adopted by the Board of Directors and subsequently submitted to the shareholders for 
approval. LC.§ 30-1-1003 (recodified as LC.§ 30-29-1003). 
In this case, AIA's Articles of Incorporation were amended in 1987 via board and 
shareholder approval. (R. 646-63.) Those Articles were amended further in 1995, but the 
redemption price of preferred shares is at a rate of $10.00 per share, in monthly payments 
amortized over fifteen (15) years at an interest rate of prime less 1 Yz% the same as stated in the 
1987 Articles. (R. 688; 660.) Thus, because the 1995 Letters are invalid and unenforceable, the 
contract between Donna and AIA is contained within the 1987 Articles. Amendments to a 
corporation's Articles of Incorporation must be approved by both the corporation's board and 
shareholders. Because AIA shareholders did not approve any amendments to Donna's 
redemption terms, the District Court was correct in holding that Donna's redemption terms are 
contained in the 1987 Articles. 
Further, Donna claims that only her consent was needed to modify the terms of the 
redemption in the 1987 Articles based on Paragraph 4.12 which states: "The rights and 
preferences hereby conferred on the Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not be changed, 
altered or revoked without the consent of the holders of the majority of the Stated Value 
Preferred Stock outstanding at the time." (R. 660.) This language does not confer any 
powers on Donna to alter the Articles unilaterally; it only prohibits AIA Services from 
changing, altering, or revoking the rights and preferences conferred on Donna without her 
consent. The language in the Articles is clear; it does not grant Donna unilateral authority to 
modify the redemption terms without shareholder approval. 
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D. The defense of ultra vires is not prohibited under J.C. § 30-1-7 
Donna argues that the defendants are prohibited from raising an ultra vires defense to the 
1995 Letter Agreements, assuming that the changes contained therein were not authorized by 
AIA shareholders. However, Donna has confused ultra vires acts with illegal acts. An ultra vires 
act is one that is beyond the scope of power granted by a corporate charter or law. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The defense of ultra vires is contained in Idaho Code § 30-1-7, 
now repealed, which states "No act of a corporation ... shall be invalidated by reason of the fact 
that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act ... " I.C. § 30-1-7 (repealed). In 
contrast, an illegal act is expressly prohibited by statute or public policy. Taylor at 564. As such, 
the defense of illegality turns on whether a statute or other public policy forbids the act or 
agreement. See Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc, v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 151 Idaho 
924,928,265 P.3d 1136, 1140 (2011) (quoting Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 
765, 768 (2002)). 
In this case, AIA is not asserting the 1995 Letters fall within the ultra vires 
defense, rather it is asserting that the 1996 PSA and the 1995 Letter Agreements are 
illegal because they violated LC. § 30-1-1003 (repealed) and LC. § 30-1-6 (repealed), 
the governing law at the various times at issue. Further, other courts have confirmed this 
distinction.8 Thus, Donna's argument that the defendants are claiming that the 1995 
Letters are ultra vires is misguided and inaccurate. 
8 See Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Gilmer, 123 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1954), aff'd, 
224 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1955); Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 113 Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac. 508 
(1931). 
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E. An illegal contract cannot be made valid by invoking waiver or 
estoppel. 
Donna argues (as did Reed in the Taylor case) that AIA and the individual 
defendants are estopped from asserting that the 1995 Letters are void. However, this 
Court has already addressed this issue in the Taylor case when it ruled " ... an illegal 
contract 'cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel."' Taylor at 565. 
Further she argues, in near incoherency, that AIA and the individual shareholders 
should be estopped from challenging the validity and enforceability of the 1995 Letters 
because to do so would benefit them and would defeat the ends of justice. Again, this is 
irrelevant as AIA and the individual defendants are not asserting the defense of ultra 
vires; however, this argument is addressed in tum. 
First, Donna relies on Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742,710 P. 755(1910). In 
that case this Court ruled that a party who benefited from an agreement cannot question 
its validity. Meholin at 762. In that case, the appellant entered into a contract with a 
bank to have stock issued in his name based on a promissory note. Id at 762. 
Subsequently, the appellant in that case argued that he was not liable on that note 
because the bank could not receive its own stock as collateral. Id at 763. This Court 
ruled that the doctrine of ultra vires should not prevail when to do so would accomplish 
a legal wrong. Id at 764. However, because neither party specially pled the defense of 
ultra vires, it was unavailable. Id. In the present case, neither side has pled the defense 
of ultra vires and therefore, Donna's argument is irrelevant to this matter. 
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Second, Donna relies on First National Bank v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 
627, 155 P.673 (1916). In that case, two men entered into a contract with Callahan 
Mining Company to purchase 400,000 shares of treasury stock in return for payment of 
$100,000. First Nat'l Bank at 636. However, Callahan only delivered 176,000 of those 
shares and the men subsequently sued to which Callahan replied that the contract was 
barred by the defense of ultra vires. Id at 63 7. This Court ruled that Callahan could not 
plead ultra vires to only those provisions benefitting the two men. Id at 641. As such, 
Callahan was estopped from using the ultra vires defense. 
In this case, AIA and the individual defendants have not pled ultra vires as a 
defense to provisions in the 1995 Letters relating to Donna and her ownership of stock 
or the interest rate related to that stock. As a result, her argument is irrelevant as it is an 
attempt to force this Court to deny a defense which AIA has not raised. Therefore, this 
Court should not address any argument relating to the ultra vires doctrine. 
F. Donna's argument that the 1995 Letter Agreements are valid are 
erroneous as she failed to present evidence that at the time those 
letters were exchanged, AIA had capital surplus, earned surplus, 
or was solvent. 
Further, Donna argues that the 1995 Letter Agreements are valid because AIA's 1989 
Amended Articles contained a provision allowing the corporation to purchase its own shares "to 
the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor and to the extent of 
unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." (R. 681.) That provision was not 
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included in the March 7, 1995 Amended Articles, and its inclusion in the 1989 Articles does not 
support Donna's argument for several reasons. 
First, the Letter Agreements were dated January 11, 1995, March 22, 1995, July 18, 
1995, and August 10, 1995. Only the first letter fell within the time of the 1989 Amended 
Articles, and that letter was superseded by the July 18, 1995 letter. (R. 602-625.) The July 18, 
1995 Letter does not include the provision in the January 11th letter that states the change in 
amortization of Donna's shares will be effective "regardless of the outcome of the private 
placement." (compare R. 602-04 with R. 608-12.) 
Second, whether or not the shareholders authorized the corporation to invade capital 
surplus to redeem Donna's shares is irrelevant because she did not present any evidence AIA 
had either "unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus" or "unrestricted capital surplus" at the 
time of the Letter Agreements. In fact, in 1995, AIA had substantial deficits across the board. (R. 
2030.) 
Third, the closing sentence of Paragraph 12 of the 1989 Amended Articles states "The 
Corporation may not purchase or pay for its own shares at a time when the Corporation is 
insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent."9 (R. 681). The record 
9The 1987 Articles also provided that redemption could occur from "legally available funds ... but only to the extent 
such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of 
its own shares. (Paragraph 4.2(a), R., 651) 
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demonstrates that in 1995, when the Letter Agreements were signed, AIA had a net deficit of 
($10,650,150) according to the accountant Donna retained. (R. 2030). 
Thus, Donna has failed to meet her burden of showing the corporation's financial status 
at the time of the Letter Agreements met any of the required tests ( earned surplus, capital surplus 
if authorized by the shareholders, or solvency) for the Letter Agreements to comply with Idaho's 
restrictions on when a corporation may redeem its own shares. 
4. The District Court did not err when it denied Donna's partial Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
A. This Court has consistently ruled that orders denying motions for 
summary judgment are not subject to review. 
This Court has the power to " ... reverse, affirm, or modify any order or judgment 
appealed from ... " LC. § 1-205. This Court has also set precedent relating to orders 
denying summary judgment stating, "As a general rule, the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is not appealable even when the appeal is from a subsequent final 
judgment." Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 328, 336 P.3d 256, 262 (2014). However, 
this Court will allow permissive appeals to orders that are otherwise not appealable if 
" ... the order involved a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
grounds for indifference of opinion and under which an immediate appeal from the 
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." Riley at 
329. 
In her appeal, Donna argues that the Court should make an exception to its 
general rule and vacate the lower court's order denying her motion for partial summary 
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judgment and the order declaring Donna holds 7, 110 preferred shares in AIA. Donna 
argues that the number of shares Donna held in AIA, at the time AIA made its last 
payment to her, was 41,651. (R. 2199.) However, that amount was based on AIA's 
redemption payments made to Donna at the interest rate of prime plus 114%. (R. 1127-44; 
1187-89.) It was later discovered that the documents allowing this increased rate (1995 
Letters and 1996 PSA) were in fact illegal and unenforceable based on governing Idaho 
Code at the time those agreements were entered into. 
There is no dispute as to the fact that Donna has been paid $2,696,797.80 in 
redemption payments. (R. 1187-89.) This Court has ruled that courts must leave the 
parties where the law finds them and neither enforce the illegal contract nor enforce 
" ... any alleged rights directly springing from such contract." Riley at 338. Based on this 
ruling, the District Court correctly re-calculated Donna's remaining shares in AIA based 
on the true interest rate that should have been applicable throughout the course of AIA's 
payments to Donna; prime less 1 Vi%. (R. 3346-50.) As a result, the District Court 
correctly ordered that all but 7, 110 of Donna's shares in AIA have been redeemed. 
Therefore, there is no basis for this Court to overrule precedent and separately 
consider the denial of Donna's motion for summary judgment. The redemption 
payments made by AIA to Donna should have been amortized at the lower interest rate 
of prime less 1 Vi %. This issue does not involve a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial grounds for indifference of opinion and under which an 
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immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation. 
B. Donna's claim that the Individual Defendants are liable to her 
under the Alter-Ego doctrine should not be addressed by this 
Court as it is beyond the scope of this appeal. 
Donna urges this Court to pierce the corporate veil and hold the individual defendants 
liable under the theory of alter-ego. However, this claim is not ripe to be addressed in this appeal 
as Donna's alter ego allegation was not part of the IRCP 54(b) Judgment. (R. 3438-40.) As such, 
the District Court was correct to deny Donna's motion for summary judgment on that issue. 
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591-92, 329 P.3d 368, 373-
74 (2014). In addition, the court declined to grant summary judgment to Donna on the alter ego 
doctrine because it found there were genuine issues of material fact on whether Donna had met 
her burden of establishing the required elements to invoke the alter ego doctrine. (R. 2608.) 
If this Court is inclined to depart from precedent and consider the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment on appeal, the Defendants ask that the Court find that doctrine does not apply 
in this case. In order to apply the alter-ego doctrine, the following must be found: there is a unity 
of interest and ownership to a point where the personalities of the corporation and the individual 
are not existent, and if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable result would 
follow. Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 556-57, 165 P.3d 261, 270-71 (2007). In the 
Vanderford case, a managing member of the Defendant corporation, Pine Townhomes, LLC, 
paid himself through the LLC's bank account. Id at 557. However, the account was so badly 
managed that an accountant could not differentiate between funds belonging to the member and 
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the LLC. Id. As such, this Court determined that the trial court was correct in allowing a jury to 
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil and apply the alter ego doctrine. Id. 
Unlike the Vanderford case, the record in this case is replete with examples of the fact 
that AIA observed the corporate formalities such as: having Articles of Incorporation (R. 649-
702); maintaining annual reports (R. 2650 - 2672); keeping minutes of board and shareholders 
meetings (R. 2710-2720, 2808-17.); and having excellent financial records (R. 1746.) Further, 
the individual Defendants cannot be held personally responsible to redeem Donna's shares 
because at the time the 1987 Articles were adopted, none of the individual defendants were in 
control over or owned a controlling interest in AIA: John Taylor was a minority shareholder and 
the Secretary of the Corporation (R. 2647;) Cashman and Beck had no involvement in AIA prior 
to 1995 (R. 2754, 2771) and Connie had no involvement in AIA prior to 2007 (R. 2724-25.) This 
shows separate and distinct corporate .and individual personalities lacking unity of interest and 
ownership to the point where the actions of the individual defendants cannot be held to be those 
of the corporation. Thus, there is no legal basis for holding any of the individual Defendants 
responsible for redeeming Donna's shares. 
C. The District Court did not err in dismissing Donna's claims of fraud and 
constructive fraud under the Economic Loss Rule. 
In Idaho, the Economic Loss Rule generally applies in negligence cases. Ramerth 
v. Heart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999). There are two exceptions to 
this general rule: (1) where a special relationship exists among the parties and (2) where 
there are unique circumstances that require a reallocation of the risk. Aardema v. US. 
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Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 792, 215 P.3d 505, 512 (2009). For the court to find a special 
relationship, one of two situations must exist: ( 1) where a professional or quasi-
professional is performing services or (2) where an entity holds itself out to the public 
as being an expert regarding a special function, and by doing so, knowingly induces 
reliance by the other party on its performance of that function. Id. 
Donna argues that this Court should create a special relationship between herself 
and the individual defendants based on the individual defendant's fiduciary duties owed 
to her vis-a-vis AJA. By doing so, Donna is asking this Court to allow Donna to seek 
tort remedies in a contract cause of action. The District Court correctly noted that Donna's 
loss is purely economic, and recognized Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that, 
unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of purely economic losses 
in tort actions absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or property, unique 
circumstances, or a special relationship. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 
1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). The court correctly determined that none of 
those exceptions to the economic loss rule applied. First, Donna makes no claim of physical 
injury to persons or property; as the court noted "Donna has presented the Court with no facts" 
which would place her economic loss into the unique circumstances exception. (R. 2419.) 
Second, there is no special relationship between Donna and the individual defendants as the 
District Court correctly noted that Idaho has only recognized the "special relationship" exception 
in an extremely limited context, which does not exist in this case. (R. 2419.) 
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In the absence of Idaho precedent on the question of whether the economic loss rule 
applied in cases claiming intentional torts as opposed to negligence involving corporate directors 
and officers, the District Court looked to Washington State; specifically the "independent duty 
doctrine," which provides that when determining if tort remedies are recoverable when a 
contractual relationship exists and the losses are purely economic, the appropriate inquiry is 
whether an independent legal duty exists outside the parties' contractual relationship. 
Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52, 176 Wash.App. 757 
(Wash.Ct.App. 2013). In this case, Donna's shareholder status was created by contract with the 
right of redemption if and when it can be done in compliance with the restrictions on stock 
purchases contained in the Idaho Business Corporations act. (R. 646-63.) Based on this, the 
District Court correctly ruled the relationship of director/shareholder does not fall within the 
extremely limited group of special relationships recognized under Idaho law. 
The District Court further clarified this ruling in its Opinion & Order on Motions to 
Reconsider when it stated Donna's fraud claims in the instant matter are duplicative ("merely a 
regurgitation") of her breach of fiduciary duty claims, and again ruled that there is no 
independent legal duty that exists outside the parties' contractual relationship. (R. 2606) Thus, no 
matter how she cloaks her claims, whether in contract or tort, in this case she is not entitled to 
anything other than redemption of her remaining shares. 10 
10 Donna's lawyer is pursuing a shareholder derivative action in Idaho federal court. That is the appropriate vehicle 
for Donna's fiduciary duty claims. 
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D. The District Court erred in holding that Donna's claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule. 
In this Cross Appeal, the Defendants ask this court to reverse the District Court's ruling, 
on reconsideration, that the economic loss rule does not bar Donna's breach of fiduciary duty 
claims. The requested ruling would be a narrow one based on the specific facts of this case, i.e. 
as a Preferred Shareholder, regardless of the causes of actions Donna pleads, the only remedy 
available to her is redemption of her Series A shares. Donna claims that the Defendants took 
actions that injured AIA's assets or the whole body of its stock; as the District Court noted, this 
is a claim that may only be brought in a derivative action and is not proper in a direct action. (R. 
2606.) 
Other courts in determining whether the economic loss rule precludes fiduciary duty 
claims have taken a common sense approach. In Florida, courts have held that the economic loss 
rule does not automatically bar a breach of fiduciary duty claim; however, the rule does apply 
when the claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based upon and inextricably intertwined with a 
claim for breach of contract. Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, 617 F. Supp. 2d 
1177 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Thus, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not survive 
where that claim is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the 
parties. That result follows because the duty is owed only as a result of the existence of the 
contract. The Michael Titze Co. Inc. v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 400 Fed. Appx. 455 (11th 
Cir. 2010); Excess Risk Underwriters, Inc. v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002). 
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Colorado follows the same approach. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Town 
of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (en bane), analyzed the source 
and contours of the economic loss rule. In that case, the court found that the essential difference 
between a tort obligation and a contract obligation is the source of the duties of the parties: 
A breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a contract between the 
parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of 
a duty arising independently of any contract duties between the parties, however, 
may support a tort action. Id. ( quoting Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. 
v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995)) 
( emphasis in original). Pertinent to this Court's analysis, the Town of Alma court 
went on to recognize that the "tort" of "breach of fiduciary duty" is "expressly 
designed to remedy pure economic loss" and that any confusion arising from 
application of the economic loss rule in such instance can be avoided "by 
maintaining the focus on the source of the duty alleged to have been violated." Id. 
at 1263 
This was also recently decided in the Southern District of New York, in which that court 
ruled that the economic loss rule precludes a fiduciary duty claim when the plaintiff is seeking 
only the benefit of a contract: 
Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant breached duties independent of its contracts 
do not, themselves, allow evasion of the economic loss rule, which presents a 
second, distinct barrier" to tort claims stemming from contractual relationships. 
The economic-loss rule provides that "a contracting party seeking only a benefit 
of the bargain recovery may not sue in tort notwithstanding the use of familiar tort 
language in its pleadings. 
BlackRock Allocation Target Shares: Series S. Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass'n, 2017 
WL 1194683, at* 15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)(internal citations omitted). 
In this case, the individual defendants' only duties to Donna relate to her status as a 
shareholder, which is inextricably intertwined with AIA's agreement to redeem her shares. As 
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such, the only remedy Donna should be allowed to seek in this action is the redemption of her 
remaining Series A shares pursuant to the terms of the 1987 Articles. For those reasons, her 
fiduciary duty claims should be barred by the economic loss rule. 
E. The District Court did not err when it dismissed Donna's claim for unjust 
enrichment. 
Donna alleges that the individual defendants have unjustly benefitted, to her detriment, 
because AIA has not redeemed all of her shares thus far. Specifically, she claims that by agreeing 
to defer five monthly redemption payments and consenting to the Reorganization Plan, she 
somehow enabled the individual defendants to gain operational control of the AIA and as a 
result, the individual shareholders looted AIA for their own personal benefit. The District Court 
was correct in ruling Donna had failed to meet the burden of making out a prima facie case 
against the individual defendants for unjust enrichment. (R. 2422.) 
Unjust enrichment occurs when a defendant receives a benefit from the plaintiff that 
would be inequitable to retain without compensation to the extent that retention is unjust. Beco 
Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). Additionally, 
the alleged recipient must also be the intended beneficiary of said benefit. Hettinga v. Synbrandy, 
126 Idaho 467, 4 71, 886 P .2d 772, 77 6 (1994 ). Recovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if 
the benefits [to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in pursuit of his own 
financial advantage. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 897, 277 P.3d 337 (2012). In this case, 
Donna contends, without citing evidence in the record, she provided a benefit to the individual 
Defendants. Further, the District Court, looking at all available evidence stated: 
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"Donna, by agreeing to allow AIA to defer five months of stock redemption 
payments in order to allow AIA to develop CropUSA, conferred a benefit on the 
corporation, not on the named individual Defendants, nor is there any evidence 
Donna intended the individual Defendants to benefit. Any benefit enjoyed by the 
individual Defendants was incidentally created as a result of Donna's pursuit of 
her own financial advantage. Therefore, recovery for unjust enrichment against 
the individuals Defendants is unavailable to Donna." (R. 2422-23.) 
Donna goes on to list a various sources of "evidence" she contends is proof of her claim 
of unjust enrichment while simultaneously admitting that evidence is outside the scope of 
this appeal. As such, this Court should not consider those arguments, and should affirm 
the District Court order dismissing her claim of unjust enrichment. 
5. The District Court erred in dismissing AIA's breach of contract 
counterclaim. 
In its response to Donna's Third Amended Complaint, AIA counterclaimed that by 
entering into a clandestine subordination agreement reversing the order of redemption priority 
between herself and Reed, she breached the contract she entered into with AIA in 1996 and the 
1995 Letter Agreements, if those agreements are held valid and enforceable. (R. 60-62 (A. 1) 11 .) 
Section 8(d) of the Series A PSA provision (R. 624 (A. 2).) required AIA's written consent to 
any amendment, modification, waiver or supplement to said agreement. Additionally, the 
subordination Agreement allowed Reed to bring suit for the principal owed to him by AIA on his 
then existing note. (R. 1040 (A. (3).) The District Court denied AIA's motion for summary 
judgment on that issue, stating "one cannot breach an illegal agreement." (R. 2428 (A. 4).) This 
ruling did not take into account the fact that the 1995 Letter Agreements also contained a 
11 "(A. 1)- "A" refers to the appendix of this brief and correlated numbers such as "l" refer to the exhibit number 
attached thereto. 
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provision subordinating payments to Reed. The District Court incorrectly ruled that Donna was 
the only beneficiary to the priority of payment, and it was her right to waive and to do so without 
legal obligation to first obtain the consent of AIA. (R. 2428 (A. 4).). 
However, the District Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the 
subordination agreement (whether in the Letter Agreements or in the PSA) was not simply an 
agreement between Reed and Donna; AIA was also a party. (R. 602-04 (A. 5).) AIA was most 
certainly a beneficiary of the subordination agreement originally agreed to in the January 11, 
1995 Letter Agreement, because it allowed the corporation to forestall making principal 
payments on Reed's $6,000,000 note. (R. 602-04 (A. 5).) When Reed and Donna unilaterally 
reversed the order of priority, which was contained in both the Letter Agreement and the PSA, it 
had a devastating financial impact on AIA in two ways: First, it made it legally impossible for 
AIA to pay Donna without being at jeopardy of a lawsuit by Reed, but when the company 
stopped making payments in 2008, she promptly filed suit (R. 86-88; 11-25; 617-25 (A. 3; 6; 
2).)Second, the reverse subordination agreement had a substantial adverse effect on AIA as it 
enabled Reed to immediately sue AIA for the full amount owed under his stock redemption 
agreement, rather than being entitled to interest only, which is what he did. See generally, Taylor 
v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
In addition, when Donna had agreed to subordinate all amounts and obligations owed to 
her by AIA to Reed, she failed to disclose this fact to AIA and as a result, continued to receive 
payments from the company. (R. 1746 (A. 7).) From the time she entered into the subordination 
agreement in 2006, until AIA was advised that her PSA was an illegal and unenforceable 
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contract, she received $175,000 in payments that she had no right to receive. (R.1746 (A. 7).) 
Therefore, AIA asks that this Court reverse the order dismissing AIA' s counterclaim. 
VI. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
1. Donna is not entitled to costs or fees on appeal. 
Donna requests an award of costs and fees on appeal based on Idaho App. R. 40 and 41, 
as well as Idaho Code § 12-121. However, she is not entitled to fees under any of those 
provisions for two reasons: (1) She was not a prevailing party below, and (2) the Respondents' 
defense in this appeal is not frivolous. An award of reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to 
the prevailing party if it is found that the case was brought, defended frivolously, or defended 
unreasonably without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121. However, this statutory power is 
discretionary. Minich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078 1085 (1979). 
Further, it is not the case that this Court will award attorney's fees as a matter of right or against 
a losing party who brought an appeal in good faith with genuine issues. Id. As such, if this Court 
is inclined to consider Donna a prevailing party, it is the case that AIA and the individual 
defendants have presented, in good faith, genuine issues to this Court and as a result, Donna 
should not be entitled to attorney's fees or costs. 
2. The Respondents are entitled to costs and fees on appeal as Donna's claims are 
frivolous attempts at re-litigating the same issues. 
Lastly, AIA and the individual defendants request that this Court find that Donna's 
appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and award costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. Idaho Code § 12-121; Idaho App. R. 40-41. Further, those costs and fees should also be 
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assessed against Donna's counsel under IRCP 1 l(c)(3)-(4). Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(3)-(4), 
this Court has the discretion to impose sanctions on an attorney when he files suit for an 
improper purpose, such as harassment or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Idaho R. 
Civ. P. 1 l(b)(l) 
This appeal is, essentially, nothing more than an attempt to revisit issues which have been 
raised and rejected in prior appeals to this Court. 12 If Donna and, more importantly, her counsel, 
are not required to pay for the consequences of their actions, they will continue to file new 
lawsuits in an effort to re-litigate the same issues. This piecemeal litigation has effectively 
destroyed AIA and burdened an ever expanding class of targeted defendants with extravagant 
litigation costs. Reed and Donna have never taken their claims to trial, have been decided against 
multiple times at the District Court level, and on subsequent appeal. Yet, Reed and Donna, 
through counsel, continue to wage a war of attrition with little concern regarding the 
frivolousness of their claims or the destructive nature of this perpetual litigation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the afore-mentioned reasons, the Respondents respectfully request that this court: 
1. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's contract claim against AIA in CV 13-01075 
2. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud in CV 08-
01150 
3. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for unjust enrichment in both cases 
12 See generally: Taylor v. McNichols and Taylor v. Babbitt (consolidated); 149 Idaho 826,243. P.3d 642 (2010); 
Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829(2011 ); Taylor v. Riley and Taylor v. Eberle Berlin 
(consolidated), 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256 (2014); and Taylor v. Riley II, just decided at S. Ct. Docket No. 43686-
2015. 
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4. Reverse the dismissal of AIA's counterclaim for breach of contract in CV 13-01075 
5. A ward costs and attorney fees on appeal to the Respondents. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DONNAJ. TAYLOR, No. CV-13-01075 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION'S 
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; 
CONNIE TAYLOR HENDERSON; 
JAMES W. BECK; and MICHAEL W. 
CASHMAN, SR., 
Defendants. 
Defendant A.I.A. Services Corporation answers plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
1. Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a 
belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 1 and therefore denies the same. 
2. Defendant admits it is an Idaho corporation having its principal offices in 
Lewiston, Idaho. The remaining allegations of paragraph 2 appear to be directed to 
entities that are neither named as defendants or otherwise identified, and do not require 
an answer from this defendant. 
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3. Defendant admits that R. John Taylor has been a director of AIA Services 
Corporation since it was founded. The remaining allegations of paragraph 3 are directed 
to defendant R. John Taylor and do not require an answer from this defendant 
4. The allegations of paragraph 4 are directed to defendant Connie Taylor 
Henderson and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
5. The allegations of paragraph 5 are directed to defendant James Beck and 
do not require an answer from this defendant. 
6. The allegations of paragraph 6 are directed to defendant Michael W. 
Cashman, Sr. and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
7. 
8. 
Defendant denies paragraph 7 to the extent it contains an allegation. 
Defendant do~ not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a 
belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same. 
9. Defendant denies paragraph 9 to the extent it contains an allegation. 
10. Defendant admits it initiated a declaratory judgment action against 
plaintiff and the other defendants named therein but denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 10. 
11. Defendant denies paragraph 11 to the extent it contains an allegation. 
12. Defendant admits that Donna Taylor acquired 200,000 shares of Series A 
Preferred Stock in 1987 pursuant to a property settlement agreement between her and 
Reed Taylor entered into incident to their divorce. Defendant does not have sufficient 
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the remaining 
allegations of paragraph 12 and therefore denies the same. 
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13. Defendant admits that amended and restated articles of incorporation were 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on December 29, 1987. Defendant does not have 
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the 
remaining allegations of paragraph 13 and therefore denies the same. 
14. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 14. 
15. Defendant admits that it entered into a January 11, 1995 letter agreement 
with Donna Taylor that, among other things, changed the interest rate and amortization 
period for the redemption of Donna Taylor's remaining shares of Series A Preferred 
Stock from that specified in AIA Services Corporation's amended and restated articles of 
incorporation. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 15, including the 
inference that the January 11, 1995 letter agreement was not expressly superseded and 
replaced in its entirety by the July I, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. 
16. Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a 
belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 16 and therefore denies the same. 
17. Defendant admits it entered into letter agreements with Donna Taylor on 
July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995 but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 17, 
including the inference that these letter agreements were not expressly superseded and 
replaced in their entirety by the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. 
18. Defendant admits it entered into the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred 
Shareholder Agreement but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 18. 
19. Defendant acknowledges that the price payable to Donna Taylor in 
redemption of her remaining shares of Series A Preferred Stock was $443,478.47 as of 
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February 21, 2008 but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 19, including the 
inference that such redemption was not invalidated by the Idaho Supreme Court's 
subsequent ruling in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation et al. 
20. Defendant admits it bas not made any payments to Donna Taylor since 
May 2008 with respect to the redemption of her remaining shares of Series A Preferred 
Stock but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 20. 
21. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21, specifically the 
allegation that, if the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement is found to 
be illegal or unenforceable, the January 11, 1995, July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995 
letter agreements are somehow revived. 
22. Defendant admits the amount payable to Donna Taylor in redemption of 
her remaining shares of Series A Preferred Stock is approximately $82,000. Defendant 
denies paragraph 22 to the extent it contains other allegations. 
23. Defendant admits it has not paid Donna Taylor according to her demands 
but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 23, including the inference that her 
demands are valid. 
24. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 24. 
25. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 25. 
26. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 26. 
27. Defendant admits that R. John Taylor has been the president and a director 
since 1995. The remaining allegations of paragraph 27 are directed to defendant R John 
Taylor and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
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28. Defendant admits that Connie Taylor Henderson has been a director since 
2007. The remaining allegations of paragraph 28 are directed to defendant Connie Taylor 
Henderson and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
29. Defendant admits that James Beck has been a director since 2007. The 
remaining allegations of paragraph 29 are directed to defendant James Beck and do not 
require an answer from this defendant. 
30. Defendant admits that Michael W. Cashman, Sr. has been a director for 
several years starting in 1995. The remaining allegations of paragraph 30 are directed to 
defendant Michael W. Cashman, Sr. and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
31. The allegations of paragraphs 31 through 36 and paragraphs 39 through 41 
are dir~cted to other defendants and do not require an answer from this defendant. 
32. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 37 insofar as they are 
directed to this defendant. 
33. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 38, including the inference 
that it has any obligation to Donna Taylor. 
34. Defendant answers paragraph 42 by reincorporating its answers to 
paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 
35. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 43. 
36. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 44. 
37. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 45. 
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38. The allegations of paragraphs 46 through 56 are either directed to other 
defendants and do not require an answer from this defendant or do not contain an 
allegation requiring an answer. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Defendant asserts the following by way of affirmative defense: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff's complaint fails to plead with requisite particularity the acts and 
conduct upon which her claims are predicated. 
3. Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party to this action. 
4. Pbµntj.ff's claims are barred by the doc_trines of issue preclusion or res 
judicata, and claims preclusion or collateral estoppel. 
5. Plaintiffs claims are barred because they are the subject of a previously 
filed, pending action or actions in this and other courts. 
6. Plaintiff's claims are barred by substantive unconscionability or her 
violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
7. 
8. 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. 
Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by applicable statutes of 
limitation or laches. 
9. Plaintiff's damages, if any, were caused by her own acts, conduct and 
omissions. 
10. Plaintiff's claims are barred by her unclean hands. 
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COUNTERCLAIM 
AlA Services Corporation alleges and states the following by way of 
counterclaim against Donna J. Taylor: 
1. The July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement was entered 
into coincident with AIA Services Corporation's and Reed Taylor's execution of an 
agreement that restructured AlA Services Corporation's obligations to Reed Taylor under 
a July 12, 1995 stock redemption agreement between AIA Services Corporation and Mr. 
Taylor. 
2. The July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement provided, 
among other things, that it could not be amended or modified without the approval or 
consent of all of the p~ies to the agreement, including_ AIA Services Corporation. 
3. In December 2006 Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor signed a subordination 
agreement (hereafter, the "Subordination Agreement") prepared on Reed Taylor's behalf 
by the attorney representing Donna Taylor in this action. The Subordination Agreement 
r~versed the order of subordination set forth in the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred 
Shareholders Agreement to enable Reed Taylor to demand and receive payments for his 
common stock pursuant to the July 12, 1995 redemption agreement prior to the full 
redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock. 
4. AIA Services Corporation was not informed of the Subordination 
Agreement prior to its execution. 
5. AIA Services Corporation did not consent to, ratify or otherwise approve 
the Subordination Agreement. 
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6. Following execution of the Subordination Agreement, Reed Taylor sued 
AIA Services Corporation and others in this court to compel AIA Services Corporation to 
redeem his common stock in AIA Services Corporation. This lawsuit culminated in the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation et al. that the 
July 12, 1995 redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA Services Corporation 
was illegal and unenforceable. 
7. But for the Subordination Agreement, Reed Taylor could not have 
demanded redemption of his common stock in AIA Services Corporation when he did, 
nor sued AIA Services Corporation and others as he did. 
8. But for the Subordination Agreement, Donna Taylor would have had no 
conceivable basis for suing AIA Services Corporation, R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor 
Henderson, James Beck or Michael W. Cashman, Sr. in this or any of the other myriad 
actions she has brought with respect to the redemption of her remaining shares of Series 
A Preferred Stock. 
9. By signing the Subordination Agreement Donna Taylor breached the July 
1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement. 
10. AIA Services Corporation has incurred and paid hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in attorneys' fees and costs since the Subordination Agreement as signed, 
responding to the various lawsuits described above. Any damages that are awarded to 
Donna Taylor in this action should be offset by these attorneys' fees and costs. 
II 
II 
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DATED this 17th day of June, 2013. 
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RANDALL I DANSKlN 
~ }>. 8;1,,11wn--~ 
Douglas Siddoway, ISB No.238!0 
Attorneys for Defendant AIA Services 
Corporation 
601 W. Riverside, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 9920 I 
(509) 747-2052 (telephone) 
(509) 624-2528 (facsimile) 
djs@randalldanskin.com 
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MARTELLE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
Martin J. Martelle, Attorney 
Christopher Williams, Attorney 
Vanessa Mooney, Legal Intern 
September 27, 2017 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616-6048 
Phone: (208) 938-8500 
Fax: (208) 938-8503 
ATTN: RONNIE A MORROW 
Department of the Treasury - Appeals Office 
Internal Revenue Service 
Memphis Campus Appeals 
PO Box 622, Stop 86 
Memphis, TN 38101-0622 
Re: RICHARD W. HERGERT 
Taxpayer Identification No.: 518-58-5850 
Dear Mr. Morrow: 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE 
855-730-1989 
PAGES 
Confirmation Received 
Our office just faxed you a copy of Mr. Hergert's Offer in Compromise this morning. Mr. 
Hergert felt the income figures weren't correct when he was signing the paperwork, and quickly 
went to meet with his Certified Public Accountant. The Certified Public Accountant stated he 
had an employee working on the Profit and Loss statement on her last day of working with the 
Accounting Firm, and there could be errors in entries. His Certified Public Accountant reviewed 
all income and expense entries that were made, and it turned out that this was the case. The 
Certified Public Accountant updated the Profit and Loss Statement with corrected figures and 
emailed it to us just moments ago. We're attaching it for your review. 
As you know, this will change the figures on the 433-A (OIC) that was just faxed and mailed to 
you. It will also change the cover letter that we prepared for the Offer in Compromise Unit. We 
prepared this letter to try to explain the "extra income" that didn't truly exist. Again, this didn't 
add up to the taxpayer, which is why he met with the Certified Public Accountant right away. 
The total income we had listed on what was faxed to you this morning was $4,560.00. With this 
change, the total income will now be $3,385.00; thus, leaving an excess income of only $67.00. 
We're attaching an updated 433-B (OIC) that will be signed and returned to you next Monday, 
October 2"ct. We're also attaching a copy of the updated cover letter for the Offer Unit that will 
need to replace the letter that is in the faxed/mailed copy. 
We just wanted to make you aware of this before you started reviewing everything in advance of 
our scheduled CDP Hearing on October 10th. 
MARTELLE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
Page Two: 
We're requesting that once you replace the 433-A (OIC) that is in the faxed/mailed copy with the 
signed copy we'll fax to you on Monday. You'll be receiving the mailed copy over the next few 
days. 
We're sincerely sorry for the confusion, and if you have any questions, please don't hesitate to 
contact me. If I'm unavailable you may speak with my assistant, Dena Basauri. Her CAF 
number is: 0303-36468R. 
Kindest Regards, 
MARTIN J. MARTELLE 
Attorney at Law 
MM/dmb 
Enc.: As noted herein 

SERlES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT 
TIDS SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is 
made and entered into this 1st day of July 1996, by and among All\ SERVICES CORPORATION, 
an Idaho corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor) and DONNA J. TAYLOR 
("Series A Preferred Shareholder"). 
RECITALS: 
A. Series A Preferred Shareholder is the owner of all of Company's issued and 
outstanding Series A Preferred Stock. Company is redeeming that stock pursuant to (i) Company's 
articles of incorporation and (ii) that certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cu mer 
L. Green ("Green") dated January 11, 1995, as amended by (a) that certain letter from Green to 
Richard A Riley (''Riley") dated March 22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement among the parties, 
Green and Richard W. Campanaro dated July 18, 1995, and (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley 
dated August 10, 1995 (collectively, the "Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements"). 
Pursuant to the Letter Agreements, Company has reamortized its redemption obligation to Series A 
Preferred Shareholder over a shorter period and has increased the rate of interest paid to Series A 
Preferred Shareholder in exchange of waiver by Series A Preferred Shareholder of alleged defaults 
by Company and other consideration. 
B. Pursuant to that certain Stock_ Redemption Agreement between Company and 
Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement 
also dated July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redemption Agreement") and related agreements 
including (without limitation) a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a 
Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest 
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in certain collateral to secure payment of the $6M Note, all of Creditor's shares of com1no11 stock of 
Company were redeemed. 
C. As part consideration of the redemption of Creditor's common stock, Company: (i) 
executed a promissory note dated July 22, 199 5 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of 
$1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995 
payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note"). 
D. Simultaneously with the redemption of Creditor's common stock, the Company 
reorganized by selling 150,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock for $1.5 million, contributing that 
$1. 5 million to the Company's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance 
Company ("ULIC"), and distributing ULIC's stock of its subsidiary, .AJA Insurance, Inc. to the 
Company ("Reorganization"). 
E. In connection with the redemption of Creditor's common stock and Company's 
reorganization., the parties entered into the Letter Agreement dated July 18, 1995 which, among other 
things, imposed certain restrictions on Company's payment of interest and principal to Creditor. 
F. Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Creditor have entered 
into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement") pursuant 
to which Company's obligations to Creditor under the Stock Redemption Agreement and related 
agreements have been restructured (the "Restructure"). 
G. As a part of the Restructure, Company and Creditor have agreed to amend and restate 
the Down Payment Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment 
Note"), the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement. 
H. In consideration of Company's. willingness to accelerate principal payments to Series 
A Preferred Shareholder on its redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock, the Series A Preferred 
Shareholder is willing to release Company and Creditor from certain of those interest and principal 
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payment restrictions contained in the Letter Agreements and to release Company from any and all 
defaults under Company's Articles ofincorporation or the Letter Agreements, and to consent to the 
restructure of Company's obligations to pay principal and interesno Creditor pursuant to the terms 
of the An1ended Down Payment Note as provided therein and in the Restructure Agreement. 
AGREEMENTS 
1. Series A Preferred Stock Redemption. 
(a) Company will continue monthly payments to Series A Prefen-ed Shareholder 
in accordance with a ten year amortization (from the date redemption commenced) at prime rate plus 
1!.i% pursuant to paragraph 1 of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement. 
(b) In addition to (and without affecting the amount of) the regular amortized 
payment, Company wiU accelerate payment of principai by paying Series A Preferred Shareholder 
$100,000 at the end of each six-month period beginning at the end of the six-month period 
commencing upon full payment to Creditor of the Amended Down Payment Note. 
(c) Series A Preferred Shareholder will be entitled to accelerate the total 
redemption obligation with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock upon lapse of thirty (30) days 
after default by Company in payment when due of principal or interest on such obligation, unless 
Company shall have cured such default within such 30-day period. 
2. Consent to Amended Down Payment Note, $6M Note and Security Therefor. Series 
A Preferred Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment of its obligations to Creditor in 
accordance with the terms of the Amended Dovm Payment Note and the Restructure Agreement; (ii) 
Company's payment to Creditor of its obligations to Creditor in accordance with the terms of the 
$6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof; (iii) the grant of 
security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure payment of the two 
notes; and (iv) the possible future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10 of the A.mended Stock 
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P iedge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or all of the Pledged Shares and the 
Commission Collateral. 
3. Subordination of Certain Principal Payments to Creditor. Payment of principal to 
Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right 
of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series 
A Preferred Stock. Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A 
Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not preclude 
Company from exercisir1g any contractual or equitable right of offset against the principal of the $6M 
Note). 
4. Unconditional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and its 
subsidiaries, their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents 
in their offkial capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including, without limitation: 
the assertion of purported dissenter's rights in connection with certain 
transactions between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Company; 
(ii) all claims against Company which are the subject of the various pleadings filed 
on behalf of Series A Preferred Shareholder in her divorce action against Creditor in Case No. 5108 7 
filed in Nez Perce County, Idaho; 
(iii) any breach of Company's articles of incorporation or the terms or conditions 
of any of the Letter Agreements; 
(iv) any and all claims arising in connection with the Restructure, including 
(without limitation) any dissenter's rights in connection therewith; and 
(v) any acts or omissions by Company, its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, 
directors, officers, employees or other agents. 
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5. Agreement to Forbear. Notwithstanding the foregoing release, Series A Preferred 
Shareholder's rights and protection under Company's articles of incorporation shall be preserved; 
provided, however, that so long as Company has not failed to pay principal or interest for redemption 
of the Series A Preferred Stock hereunder when due or within the thirty-day cure period provided 
by Section l ( c) hereof, Series A Preferred Shareholder agrees to forbear from alleging any default 
under Company's articles of incorporation and further agrees to forbear from exercising or attempting 
to exercise any remedy for such default, whether arising from the terms of the articles of 
incorporation or under legal or equitable principles. 
6. Estoppel Certificate. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that, to date, 
Company has (i) paid $384,010 of principal of its obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred ·Stock 
and (ii) has redeemed 38,401 shares of the 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock originally 
issued to Series A Preferred Shareholder; and Series A Preferred Shareholder further acknowledges 
. that (iii) the unpaid principal balance of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock 
is $1,615,990 and (iv) 161,599 shares of Series A Preferred Stock remain outstanding. 
7. Representations and Warranties. Series A Preferred Shareholder represents and 
warrants to Company and to Creditor as follows: 
(a) Series A Preferred Shareholder owns beneficially and of record all of the 
outstanding Series A Preferred Stock, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security 
interests, equities, claims, options or other limitations on Series A Preferred Shareholder's ability to 
transfer such shares to Company upon payment of the redemption price. Series A Preferred 
Shareholder has full right, title and interest in and to the Series A Preferred Stock, and the legal 
capacity and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement 
and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and thereby. 
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(b) Company and Creditor have advised Series A Preferred Shareholder to consult 
legal and other professional counsel in connection with this Agreement and the Restructure 
Agreement and has had the opportunity to do so. Series A Preferred Shareholder has consulted such 
attorneys, accountants, family members and other advisors as she has deemed necessary or desirable 
to assist her in reviewing this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement and in determining whether 
it is in her best interests to execute and deliver them. Series A Preferred Shareholder has read and 
understands the terms and conditions of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement, as well as 
the Letter Agreements which · are being superseded and replaced by this Agreement and the 
Restructure Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that she has had no contact 
with Company or any of its directors, officers, legal counsel or other agents concerning this 
Agreement or the Restructure Agreement; that this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have 
been drafted by counsel for Company and reviewed by counsel for Creditor; and that neither 
Company, Creditor nor their respective counsel have represented Series A Preferred Shareholder in 
connection herewith or therewith. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that her execution 
and delivery of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have not been obtained by fraud, 
duress, undue influence, coercion, breach of fiduciary relationship or breach of relationship of 
confidence and trust; and Series A Preferred Shareholder hereby indemnifies Company against any 
and all claims that her execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement-was 
obtained by any such means. 
622 
SERIES A PRFFF.RRF.DSHARF.HrnnFR AGRF.F.lvrr-wr.bhibit • F • Page mi 6 
I ,. 
8. General Terms. 
(a) All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings 
assigned in the Restructure Agreement. 
(b) This Agreement supersedes any replaces the Letter Agreements in their 
entirety. The Letter Agreements shall hereafter have no further force or effect. 
( c) All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are required 
to be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly 
given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or telegram, or by certified 
or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the respective parties as 
follows: 
Ifto Company, to: 
With a copy to: 
Ifto Creditor to: 
With a copy to: 
Ifto Series A Preferred 
Shareholder, to: 
AIA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
One Lewis Clark Plaza 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Attention: John Taylor 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McK.lveen, Chartered 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise ID 83701-1368 
Attention: Richard A. Riley 
Reed J. Taylor 
P.O. Box 1165 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Cairncross & Hempelmann 
70th Floor, Columbia Center 
701 Fifth Avenue 
Seattle WA 98104-7016 
Attention: W. Frank Taylor 
Donna J. Taylor 
c/o 
---------
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or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance 
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt. Company's 
payments of its redemption obligation to Series A Preferred Shareholder shall be delivered to Series 
A Preferred Shareholder at her notice address as provided above. 
( d) This Agreement and the other Restructure Agreement contain the complete 
and final expression of the entire agreement of the parties concerning Company's redemption of the 
Series A Preferred Stock. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or 
supplemented, except by a writing signed by all parties to this Agreement. 
(e) This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the 
laws of the State ofldaho, without giving effect to any provisions or principles regarding conflict of 
laws. 
(f) Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way affect 
the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement. 
(g) Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with and inseparable from 
every other provision hereof; and each covenant herein is given in consideration of every other 
covenant herein. If any provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or inapplicable 
to any person or circumstance to which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or in part, this entire 
Agreement shall be void. 
624 
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EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above_ 
COI\1PANY: 
CREDITOR: 
SERIES A PREFERRED 
SHAREHOLDER: 
APPROVED: By 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
~; !lJ:!:: 7f 
REED J. TAYLOR 
_// / 
r:·· Rh//~--
/ // / 
I 
DONNA TAYLOR 
;{{)~~ 
----------
for Series A 
---
Preferred Shareholder 
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SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT 
This Subordination Agreement ("Agreement'') is entered mto as of December 1, 2006, by 
and between Donna l Taylor, o single perso1J t'Donna"} and Reed J. I aylor, a single person · 
("Reed''). Reed and Donna are bereinafte1 referred to individually as a "Party" and/ol' collectively 
as the "Pe.rtie3_" 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained in this 
Agreement, the sufficiency of whjch is acknowledged as sufficient, fuJJ and complete 
consideration for this Agreement, the Parties agree as follows: 
I. Subordination. Donna agrees to uncomlitionaJly and irrevocably suboniinate all 
amounts and obligations owed to her under the Series A Preferred Shm·eholder Agreement 
between AJA Sen•ices Cotporatlon ("AJA Services"), Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996 
(including any modificotions thereto, if applicable) to be junior to all payments (including 
principal and interest), obligations, rights and/or remedies owed to Reed by AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance, Inc. ("AIA lnswancc'') and/01 any o!herperson or entity, The effect of this Agreement 
shaJJ be to make all obligations and/or amounts owed to Donna Taylor by AIA Services 
Corporation, AJA Insurance, R John Taylm and any other person or entity subordinate and 
junior to all amounts and obligations owed to Reed by the foregoing persons and entities unde1 
the agI"eements identified in Section 2 Reed shall be entitled to colJect aU amounts owed to him 
before Donna's PrefeITed A Shares of AIA Services are ,~deemed or any further payments rue 
made to Dorma. The effect of this Agreement shall be to permit Reed to collect, litigate, obtain 
judgment, and/or enfon:e any and all rights and lemodies which relate in any way to the $6 
Million Promisso1y Note, plus all accmed interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees owed to 
Reed through the various agreements set forth in Section 2 below. Thi!! Agreement may result in 
Reed obtaining pa}'lllent, assets, and/ot· judgments which represent some or aU of the amounts 
owed to him, while Donna's rights will be junior and inferior to Reed. Donna authorizes Reed to 
provide copies of this Agreement to any pet-son, entity or cowt as Reed may unilaterally elect in 
his sole ruscretion-
2. Ae:r-eements Affected by Donna's Subordination. Donna expressly subordinates all 
amounts, rights, obligations, and remedies owed lo her in favo1 of (and junior to) Reed J I ayfor 
tmder the folloVl.!ing agreements (including all claims, remedies, rights under such agrei,ments): 
(a) $6 Million Promisso1y Note between Reed and AJA Services Corpo1ation ("AIA Services") 
dated August l, 1995; (b) Stock Redemption Rcsttucture Agreement between Reed, Donna and 
AIA Se1vic;es dated July Z, 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between 
AIA Services and Reed dated July J, 1996; (d) Amended and Restated Security Agreement 
between AJA Services, AlA Insurance, Jnc , and Reed dated July l, 1996; and (e) Letter between 
Reed, R Jolm Tf!.ylox~ and Donna dated Februiuy 27, 2001; (f) Se.lies A Preferred Shareh0Ide1 
Agreement between AIA Services, Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996; end (g) any othe1 
agi-eement, contmct or promise of any kind or nature. 
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3. No Waiver of AIA Scrvlces Corporation1s Defaults. The Parties acknowledge and 
agree tha1 the execution of this Agreement shall not constitute either Party's waiver of AIA 
Service's dofaults on paymentl3 due to Donna This Agreement simply subordinates all amounts 
and obligations due to Donna uude1 the Sedes A Prefeued Shareholder Agreement in favm' of 
amounts and obligations owed to Reed. 
4. No Wniv<-r of Personnl Indebtedness. The Parties agree that this Agreement shall 
not waive, modli)r 01 exting•iisb any personal indebtedness w.h.ich may be owed by R. John 
Taylor or Connie Taylot to either Party for any debt, claim or cause of action. 
5. Voluntary Execution. In executing this Agreement, the Parties acknowledge that 
they have either consulted with an attorney prior to executing this Agreement or have elected to 
ente1· into this Agrocmcnt withoul consulting an attorney. The Parties aclmowledge that they 
have executed this Agreement only after careful independent investigation, voluntaiily and 
without fraud, duress or undtie influence I'he Pa.rties expressly waive any and all defenses 
which may bo later alleged or pled relati11g to lack of or failure of consideration. The Pa1ties 
expressly agree that their mutual promises nre 11dcquato and more than sufficient considelfltion 
for this Agreement. 
6. Right, Powe~· 1md Aut!writy. The Parties wnnant to each other that they have the 
right, power 11lld authority to execute and en(er into this Agreement. Donna represents that she 
has not assigned her rights to any payments or othei rights In the Series A Preferred Shareholder 
Agreement to any person 01· entity. 
7. .EITe~t. This Agreement shall be birlding upon and inure to the benefit of each Pruty to 
this Agc~ement, together with his/her agents, spouses, heirs, executors, admlnimators, 
successors, and a1J persons uow or hereafter holding or having all or any part of the interest of a 
Patty to this Agreement If My dispute, conflict, 01 question arises between the Parties regarding 
o.ny lnte1pretatio11 of this Agn:emcnt and/oi- the law, the Patties agree that the terms, conditions, 
and ob!igntions created undei this Agreement shall not be consoued and/or inte1preted agninst 
the drafting party. 
8. Applicable Lnw. The Parties agree that this Agreement sho.!1 be inte1preted under the 
laws of the State ofidllho and venue of any dispute shall be in Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
9. Countorpiu·t~ and Facslndlo or Scanned Tr!n11mlssfon. This Agreement may be 
executed in counte1parts, each of which shell! be deemed an original insttument. Facsimile or 
scanned trn.nsmissions of any signed original document, or transmission of any signed facsimile 
or scanned document, shall be the same ns. delivo1y of an executed odginal. At the 1equest of an_y 
of a Party, the Parties shnll c-onfinn facsimile transmission signatures by sigriing and delivering 
an original document. The Partie~ may execule duplicate originals of the Agreement. 
10. Asslgnn1ent, Reed may assign this Agreement and/or any rights under this Agreement 
without Donna's consent. 
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11. Furthe:r Assurance§. Donnn and Reed agree to cxeoute any iu,d all further documents, 
pleadings-, agreements nnd the like necessary to carry out the terms and intent ofthis A~emc:int. 
The Parties hereby execute this Agreement ns of the date indicated nbove_ 
DonnaJ. Ta 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE OND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR HE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
and 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; CONNIE 
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK; 
and MICHAEL CASHMAN, SR., 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV08-01150 and 
) CV13-01075 (Consolidated cases) 
) 
) OPINION AND ORDER ON 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE, 
) MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------) 
Taylo1· v. Taylor 
Opinion & Order on Motions 
v\ 
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Tiris matter is before the Court onDefendants' .Motion to. Dismiss, Motion for Summ-ary ·· 
Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Peterson Declaration, and on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions on May 23, 2014. 
Plaintiff Donna Taylor was repre$ented by attorney Roderick C. Bond. Defendant AIA Ser:vices 
Corporation was represented by attorney Douglas J. Siddoway. Defendants John Taylor, Connie 
Taylor Henderson, James Beck, and Michael Cashman were represented by attorney David R. 
Risley. The Court, having read the Motions, affidavits, and briefs filed by the parties, having 
reviewed the record, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
This Court articulated the material facts in this matter in its Opinion and Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered in July 26, 2013. For efficiency, the 
Court will only repeat in part the facts as stated in that Order. 
In 1995, a stock redemption agreement was entered into between AIA Services 
Corporation («AIA"), shareholder Reed Taylor ("Reed"), who owned common shares, and 
shareholder Donna Taylor ("Donna"), the sole owner of all outstanding Preferred A Shares 
issued by the corporation1• The corporation quickly found it was in default, however, and the 
parties opted to enter into a new restructured agreement in 1996.2 Under the 1996 Series A 
Preferred Shareholder Agreement, AIA was to redeem Donna's shares over a ten year 
amortization payment schedule. 3 The 1996 restructured agreement provided for Reed Taylor to 
1 Donna Taylor became the owner of the Preferred A shares as part of a prope1ty settlement when, prior to 1995, 
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor divorced. 
2 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009. 
3 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009. 
Taylor v. Taylor 
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receive certain payments over-the.same ten,year period with payment of a $6 million promissory . . _ ., : ·-=-- ,-,; 
note at the end of the ten years. The restructured agreement further provided that the 
corporation's debt to Donna was s"11ior to its debt to Reed.4 In exchange for AIA's agreement to 
accelerate .payment of the principal due o_n the redemptioµ_ ofthe Series A Pre_fe~r~d S~ares1 . _ ... 
Donna agreed to release AIA from any claims of breach or default relative to the 1995 Series A 
Preferred stock redemption agreement. 5 
AIA Services was incorporated in the mid 1980's and, since that time, John Taylor 
("John") has held the position of president of the corporation.6 Reed Taylor ("Reed") was the 
founder and majority shareholder of AIA until 1995, when AIA agreed to redeem Reed's 
common stocks. Upon the redemption of Reed's shares, John Taylor became the majority 
shareholder. John Taylor continues to be the majority shareholder of AIA and continues to hold 
the position of president of the corporation. 
In a letter dated February 2001, John Taylor informed Donna that AIA was developing an 
insurance program through a new company named CropUSA and requested AIA be allowed to 
defer five months of stock redemption payments, with the understanding the amounts would be 
paid at the end of contract. 7 Donna agreed to defer the payments based on the personal guarantee 
of payment by John Taylor and Reed Taylor.8 
By 2006, AIA was in default of its 1996 stock redemption agreements with both Donna 
Taylor and Reed Taylor.9 In December 2006, Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate the amounts 
4 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October I, 2009. 
5 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009 at~ H. 
6 Deposition of John Taylor, attached to the Affidavit of Michael S. Bissell filed October 1, 2009. 
7 Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed October 1, 
2009. 
8 Exhibit 2 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October 15, 2009. 
9 AJA entered into an agreement in 1996 to redeem Donna Taylor's Preferred A shares and with Reed Taylor to 
redeem his common shares. 
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· -- and obligations owecrto her::by AIA to those amounts and obligations owed to Reed Taylor by 
AIA. Donna and Reed reduced their agreement to writing in a subordination agreement dated 
December 1, 2006. 10 In January 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA and others, including 
John Taylor and Connie Taylor, asse1iing numerous causes of action including br_each of . 
contract. 11 That action was stayed pending appeal on the issue of whether the 1995 stock 
redemption agreement between AIA and Reed Taylor and the 1996 restructured stock 
redemption agreement were illegal contracts under the applicable statutory stock redemption 
statute as it existed in 1995 and 1996. 
On June 2, 2008, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed the above-entitled action against Defendant 
John Taylor. John Taylor timely filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. On 
October 27, 2008, by stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding as a 
defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie"). 12 John Taylor timely filed an Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Com1terclaim, as did Connie Taylor. 
In October 2009, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Defendant John Taylor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Connie Taylor 
filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions in November 2009. 
The Court subsequently entered a stay in Donna Taylor's action after finding Donna's matters 
shared common questions of law with Reed Taylor's action against the same Defendants and, 
because the issues of law were on appeal, Donna's matter should be stayed pending a ruling on 
the legal issues. In May 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services 
10 Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October 15, 2009. 
11Reed Taylor v. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLeeDuclos, Crop 
USA Insurance, James Beck and Corrine Beck, Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208. 
12 Connie Taylor was added as a defendant ~hen it was determined John Taylor and Connie Taylor continue to own 
assets as community property. The marriage of John Taylor and Connie Taylor was terminated by an Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce in December 2005. However, the parties have not sought, nor has the court entered, a property 
settlement dividing the community property that comprised the marital estate. 
4 
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Corporation, ·-151 Idaho353,261 P.3.d 829 (20H)-affomedthis Court's finding that the Stocke ·-.=-- -
Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, having violated the earned and capital 
surplus limitations in LC. § 30-1-6 as the statute existed in 1995 and 1996 . 
.. Following entry of the Idaho SupremeCourt's ruling in Reed Taylor's cas_t;\I)efend_ants __ 
Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to have the Court find as a matter 
oflaw that the value of Donna Taylor's unredeemed stocks is $82,000.00, a value that was 
disputed by Donna. The Court denied Defendant Taylors' Motion, lifted the stay, and informed 
the parties that, should they desire, they could re-notice their 2009 motions and file additional 
briefing. 
In 2013, Donna Taylor filed a Complaint against AIA Services Corporation, R. John 
Taylor, Connie Taylor Henderson, James W. Beck, and Michael W. Cashman, Sr. asse1iing 
claims against AIA for breach of contract, against R. John Taylor, CoIU1ie Taylor Henderson, 
James Beck, and Michael W. Cashman, Sr. claims for breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and 
abetting fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment, and as against all parties a cause of action 
seeking declaratory relief/specific performance. The 2013 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No. 
CV13-1075) and the 2008 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No. CV08-1150) were consolidated 
by Order of the Court on August 7, 2013. Currently before the Court are motions re-filed by the 
parties in the 2009 matter and the 2013 matter. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no 
5 
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disputed issues-of material fact.. In making this determination; 0all disputed facts are liberally"- -
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue 
of material fact. De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 2014 WL 1266104 (2014). Inferences 
that can reasonably be.made from the record are made in favor of the non-movjQg party. Jd_ _ 
However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence. If the record raises 
neither a question of witness credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary 
judgment should be granted. Id The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving 
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case. ParkWest Homes, LLCv. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,682,302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PEDERSON DECLARATION 
Defendants seek to have the Court strike portions ofthe declaration filed by Plaintiff's 
expert, Paul Pederson. In particular, Defendants seek to strike Pederson's adoption and 
incorporation of his affidavit filed in Reed Taylor's case, arguing it is not part of this record. 
Defendants further assert portions of statements are conclusory, opinions of law, or based on 
facts for which Pederson has no direct knowledge. The Court, without striking the declaration, 
will determine what is relevant and proper and will consider only those statements that are 
admissible expert statements. 
B. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants contend the tort 
claims are barred by the economic loss rule. The Court agrees. 
6 
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--Idaho's Appellate Courts have consistently.held that, unless an exception-applic.s,-the , -: 
economic loss rule precludes recovery of pureiy economic losses in negligence actions, stating 
there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling and Pump 
.. _ Co., 153 ldaho 735, 7.42, 291 P.3d 418 (2014). '~[A]s a gener1:1I rule, aplail!tiffis prohibited fr.om. 
recovery in tort for purely economic losses absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or 
property, unique circumstances, or a special relationship. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200--01 (1995)." In the instant matter, Donna 
Taylor's loss is purely economic. Therefore, her claims in tort will only survive if they fall 
within one of the exceptions to the economic loss rule. 
The first exception occurs when economic loss accompanies, or is parasitic to, physical 
injury to persons or prope1iy. This exception is clearly not applicable to the instant matter, as 
Donna Taylor asserts no injury to her person or property. The second exception occurs when 
unique circumstances require re-allocation of the risks. Donna Taylor has presented the Court 
with no facts that would place her economic loss into this second exception. The third exception 
occurs when there is a special relationship between the pruiies. Defendants contend the 
relationship of shareholder with the corporation or its corporate officers is not a special 
relationship as defined by Idaho case law. Plaintiff counters by arguing the economic loss rule 
bars only tort claims for negligent acts or omissions, not intentional torts as asserted by Donna. 
Addressing the type of special relationship that must exist to trigger the third exception to the 
economic loss rule, Idaho's Appellate Comis have stated, 
The 'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claims for personal 
services provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, 
engineers and insurance agents. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 
984, 992 (Ct.App.1992). A special relationship may exist where a party holds 
itself out to the public as performing a specialized function and induces reliance 
on superior knowledge and skill. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
7 
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In Duffin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a special relationship existed 
betv1reen an entity wltieh ce!iitied seed potatoes and a fam1cr who bought seed 
which was certified but defective. The seed ce:tification entity was the only such 
entity in the state. The entity held itself out to rhe public as having expertise in 
seed certific~tion and induced reliam.:e on that expertise. Furthermore, the farn1er 
was_ gbHgated to utilize the entity. Due to this specialization and induced reliance 
o-n tile ~eed certification entity's expertise, the Supreme Comt gave the fanner the 
ability to recover for pure economic loss based upon a special relationship. 
However, the Supreme Court explained in its holding that this princ.ipie only 
applies to an "extremely limited group of cases"· in which it is equitable to 
impose a duty to exercise due care to avoid the pure economic loss of another. 
Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.2d 1092 (Ct.App.2004). 
The issue of whether the economic loss rn1e bars inientional torts where damage3 are 
purely economic has not been addressed by Idaho's Appellate Courts. Other jurisdictions have, 
however, addri:ssed the issue. 
Recognizing the shortcomings of the economic loss rnle, the Eastwood court held 
that the more appropriate inquiry when cieterrnining if tort remedies are. 
recoverable \;'\rhen a contracmal relati,mshi_p also exists is whether an independent 
legal duty exists, outside the pa.1:ties' contractual relationship, imposing a duty on 
1:hetmifeasor.170 Wash.2dat389,241 P.3d 1256. Thus, thecoU11held, "An 
injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising 
independently of the term., of the contraet." Dle court named this inquiry the 
«independent duty doctrine.') Eastwood, 170 Wash.2d at 398,241 P.3d 1256. 
Although it reframed the app,:opriate inquiry and renamed the rule, the court 
noted that when determining hov,; a court can distinguish between claims where a 
plaintiff is limited to contract remedies and cases when'! recovery in tort may be 
available[, a] review of our cases, on tb.e ~ccnomic loss rule shews that ordinary 
tort p1inciples have always resolved this questi011 .... The court determines whether 
there is an independent tort duty of care, and "[t]he existence of a duty is a 
question cf lavv' and depends on mixed considerations of logic, common sense, 
justice, policy, and precedent." Evslvt·'0£1'7; 170 Wash.2d at 389, 24.1 P:3d 1256 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v. 
Med Serv. Corp. o.f E. Wash., 145 Wash.2cl 233,243, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)). 
Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52,581 i 76 Wash.App. 757, 768 
(Wash.Ct.App.2013). 
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InMcCann v. Mccann, 152 Idaho 809,815,275 P.3d 824,829 (2012), the Supreme 
Court reiterated the legal standard that a corporation and its directors owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders. "This Court held that in a closely-held corporation, the corporate directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation and to the shareholders, including the minority 
shareholders." McCann, 152 Idaho at 815. Dom1a Taylor, as a shareholder, was owed fiduciary 
duties by the Defendant corporate directors, duties that are independent of any contractual duties 
she was owed. However, Idaho's Appellate Courts have not extended the definition of 'special 
relationships' beyond those relationships involving personal services provided by professionals 
who hold themselves out to the public as performing specialized functions. Any expansion of 
the definition must be left to Idaho's Appellate Courts. Therefore, the Court does not find the 
relationship between Plaintiff Donna Taylor and the Defendants to be one for personal services 
performed by professionals. As a result, Donna's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, do not fall within the third 
exception to the economic loss rule. 
The Cowi finds none of the exceptions to the economic loss rule applicable to Plaintiff 
Donna Taylor's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, because Donna's claims are for purely economic 
loss, the economic loss rule bars her claims in tort as a matter of law. 
(C) PLAINTIFF'S UNnJST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
Plaintiff Donna Taylor asserts in her Second Amended Complaint filed November 6, 
2009 and in her 2013 Complaint, that the named individual Defendants were unjustly enriched 
when, after obtaining her approval in 2001 to defer her stock redemption payments for five 
months, Defendants transferred substantial amounts of AIA 's assets to Crop USA, Defendants 
9 
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looted AIA to their benefit, Defendants then informed Donna AIA had insufficient-funds to 
continue making the promised redemption payments, and by their conduct Defendants have been 
unjustly enriched to the detriment of Donna Taylor. Defendants contend Donna has failed to 
make out a prima facie case for unjust enrichment. 
Unjust enrichment occurs when a defendant receives a benefit that would be inequitable 
to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust. Beco Const,·. 
Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). In order to set out a 
prima facie case for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must present facts on three elements: (1) there 
was a benefit confensed upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of 
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for 
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). 
"However, the alleged recipient must also be the intended beneficiary. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 
126 Idaho 467,471, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994). Accordingly, '[r]ecovery for unjust emichment 
is unavailable if the benefits [to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in 
pursuit of his own financial advantage.' Id." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 897, 277 P .3d 
337 (2012). The party who has conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of the full 
amount thereof has the burden of proving it would be unjust for the recipient to retain any part of 
the benefit. Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316,323,924 P.2d 217,224 (Ct.App.1994). 
Donna Taylor, by agreeing to allow AJA to defer five months of stock redemption 
payments in order to allow AIA to develop CropUSA, conferred a benefit on .A.IA, not on the 
named individual Defendants, nor is there any evidence Donna intended the individual 
Defendants to benefit. Any benefit enjoyed by the individual Defendants was incidentally 
10 
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Grcated· asa·result of-Donna's pursuit of.her own financial advantage .. Therefpr<;:,J.:ecovery .for .. 
unjust emichment against the individual Defendant's in unavailable to Donna. Rather, recovery 
is available through breach of contract claims against AIA, and against John Taylor and Reed 
Taylor as guarantors. 
(D) DONNA'S CLAIM UNDER THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
In February 2001, Donna Taylor received a letter signed by John Taylor and Reed Taylor 
seeking to defer payment on Donna's stock redemption for five months in order to facilitate the 
startup of CropUSA. 13 The letter ends with, "Reed and John will guarantee the deferred 
payments." Donna subsequently agreed to defer redemption payments for five months. 
However, in breach of the agreement between the parties, the defeLTed payments have never been 
made to Donna, who now seeks to recover the five defetTed payments plus interest from John 
Taylor only. Defendants contend Reed Taylor is an indispensable pruty and must be joined by 
Donna or, in the alternative, the Court should find Donna relieved Reed of his guaranty 
obligation, thus rendering John Taylor's guaranty void. 
Rule 19(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedmes reads: 
Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process 
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party If the person 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a 
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 
13 Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed 
October 1, 2009. 
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John Taylor and Reed Taylor became co-guarantors under the terms of the deferred 
payment agreement. Donna Taylor, as the creditor, may seek recovery from either or both 
guarantors. However, if one guarantor pays more than his equal share of the debt, recover-y-for 
payment of more than his propositional share may be sought from the other guarantor. 
If a principal obligation is guaranteed by two or more persons, each must pay the 
proportional share of the liability, and a guarantor who has paid more than his or 
her share is entitled to contribution from the others and may sue to enforce that 
right. While an action for contribution may not be maintained unless the guarantor 
has paid more than his or her share of the obligation, or satisfied a judgment 
against that guarantor, it is not necessary that the guarantor have paid the entire 
debt. A guarantor may be entitled to interest on the contribution due, payable 
from the date of payment by the guarantor. 
The right to contribution among coguarantors arises from their implicit agreement 
that each would contribute his or her just proportion of any liability and, thus, is 
based on an implied contract. That right is governed by equitable principles and is 
subject to equitable defenses. 
A guarantor is entitled to contribution regardless of whether the guarantors signed 
a single or separate documents, or the creditor released the co guarantors after the 
default on the underlying loan. 
38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty§ 100. 
The Court found no Idaho case law instructive on this issue. However, the Court rejects 
Donna's argument that Reed was somehow relieved of his liability as co-guarantor. Reed Taylor 
signed the letter that create the guaranty and has offered no evidence to the contrary. The Court 
also rejects John Taylor's theory that Donna Taylor, by executing a subordination agreement 
with Reed Taylor in 2006, relieved Reed of his obligation under the guaranty without John 
Taylor's consent, and as a result John Taylor is relieved of his obligation. Defendant offers the 
Court no legal authority in support of his theory, nor has the Court found any such authority. 
The Court finds the 2001 guaranty event and the 2006 subordination agreement event to be two 
12 
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distinct and unrelated events that have no effeet on -the other,-- .Bas~d on the general principals of. 
guaranty law and I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), the Court finds Reed Taylor is not an indispensable party, as 
Donna Taylor may obtain complete relief from only one of the guarantors. If full recovery is 
obtained from John Taylor, he may theJ.?:bring.:an action ag~nst Reed_'[a)'lor, as the CQ: 
guarantor, to recover Reed's portion of the liability. 
(E) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants contend the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was illegal, thus 
making void any obligation to redeem Donna's shares. Plaintiff Donna Taylor argues that, even 
if the 1995 and 1996 redemption agreements are void, there was a prior lawful agreement 
between Donna and AIA regarding redemption of her Series A shares, that agreement was 
memorialized in three letters that preceded the 1995 and 1996 agreements, and the 'letter' 
agreement is enforceable, as it could not be superseded by an illegal agreement. Defendants 
contend the 1995 redemption agreement evidenced by the letters cannot be resun-ected by the 
Court, as the intent of the parties in entering the 1995 and 1996 agreements would be thwarted 
and Donna Taylor would be allowed to receive the benefit of a higher interest rate and 
amo11ization schedule. 
In the instant matter, the parties agree the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder 
Agreements between Donna Taylor and AIA are illegal for the same reasons Reed Taylor's 
Promissory Note for redemption of his shares was illegal. 14 The parties also agree there was an 
earlier 1995 agreement memorialized in three letters15 that lawfully provided for the redemption 
of Donna Taylor's Series A shares. However, while Donna Taylor argues the 'letters' agreement 
is enforceable, Defendants argue it was superseded by the illegal agreements and, if enforced 
14 See Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho 552,261 PJd 829 (2011). 
15 See Exhibits C, D, and E to the Affidavit of Donna Taylor filed May 23, 2013. 
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· .·· -novr,-wouJd be contrary to the intent of ·the p·m1ii3s, 1995, arid:199-6 agteements, would-reward- --· - -
Dom1a for her 'misconduct' 16, and would give Donna the benefit of a higher interest rate and 
amortization schedule. 
The Court, while unable tQ find-any instructiveldaho case law, finds the majority_ of 
jurisdictions adhere to the rule that a legal and valid contract is not made void by a subsequent 
illegal contract regarding the same subject matter. 
A subsequent illegal agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and 
lawful contract between them in relation to the same subject. The change is 
regarded as a mere nullity, and as such cannot scathe the original contract. 
Wilcoxon v. Logan, 91 N.C. 449; Britt v. Aylett, 11 Ark. 475, 52 Am.Dec. 282; 
McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746; Cain v. Bom1er, 108 Tex. 399, 
194 S.W. 1098, 3 A.L.R. 874; 15 A. & E.Ency.Law 932; Tearney v. Maimiom, 
103 W.Va. 394, 137 S.E. 543; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, s 287; Page on Contracts, sec. 
2469. See also: In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14 
A.L.R.2d 842. 
Tillman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d 101,103,244 N.C. 270,272 (N.C.1956). 
The Cami finds the "no taint" holding by other jurisdictions persuasive. The Comi also 
agrees that under Idaho law, "If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it 
finds them and refuse to enforce the contract." Wernecke v. St. ~Maries Joint School Dist. # 401, 
147 Idaho 277,287,207 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2009). Where the Court finds the parties in the instant 
matter is in the position they were just prior to the illegal agreements being entered into. The 
parties do not dispute that, prior to entering into the illegal agreements, the parties entered into an 
agreement with Donna Taylor for the redemption of her Series A shares, and that the agreement 
was memorialized in a series of three letters, with two of the letters being signed by the 
necessary parties. That agreement was a lawful and enforceable agreement establishing the 
16 Defendants argue Donna Taylor committed 'misconduct' in 2006 when she entered into a subordination 
agreement with Reed Taylor giving Reed priority over Donna relative to redemption payments. lt was within 
Donna's right to relinquish priority and to do so without the consent of AIA, who neither benefitted nor was hanned 
by the payment priority issue. 
14 
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-- temrn forredemption of Donna Taylor' s-Series-A:-shares, and, therefore, the Court finds -the. 
'letters' agreement remains valid, enforceable, and unscathed by the subsequent illegal 
agreements. Contrary to the arguments put forth by the Defendants, AIA's amended articles are 
not applicable to redemption ofDonna'sSeriesAshares,astheamendments becc1me yffo_c_:tiye. 
well after AIA entered into the 'letters' agreement with Donna. Redemption of Donna's share 
must be in conformance with the lawful and enforceable 'letters' agreement. 
(F) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the following issues: (a) the 1995 'letters' 
agreement is legal and enforceable; (b) 41,509.69 of Donna Taylor's Series A shares have yet to 
be redeemed; (c) Donna Taylor is owed $415,096.86 for unredeemed Series A shares plus 
accrued interest; (d) the controlling shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor; and 
(e) dismissal of AIA's counterclaim asserting Donna Taylor breached the 1995 and 1996 Series 
A shareholder agreement. The Court, in addressing the Motions of the Defendants, has already 
dete1mined the 1995 'letters' agreement is legal and enforceable. Therefore, the Court will not 
re-address that issue. In regard to the number of Series A shares that are outstanding and the 
value of those shares, the Court has already determined the shares must be redeemed in 
conformance with the 1995 'letters' agreement. In addition, the Court finds the number of 
unredeemed shares still held by Donna Taylor is the amount shown by AIA's records on the date 
of the la<it payment made to Donna Taylor. 
Next, the Court finds summary judgment on the issue of whether the majority 
shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor as a minority shareholder must be 
denied. Defendants have consistently maintained the legality of the business dealings involving 
AIA, CropUSA, and other entities. The parties dispute nearly every fact asserted by the other on 
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-this issue; leaving the CoU1t witlfgenuincnss-ues ofmater:i:al fachn dispute that preventa·grnnt of -· 
summary judgment. 
Lastly, the Court finds there can be no breach of the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder 
Agreements by Donna Taylor, as one cannot breach.an-illegal agreement. Defendants have . . . 
asserted the illegality of those Agreements throughout this proceeding and Idaho's Supreme 
Court held the Agreements illegal in Taylor v. AJA, I 51 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). Therefore, 
Domia Taylor cannot be held to have breached an illegal agreement by entering into a 
subordination agreement with Reed Taylor. In addition, the Court finds no breach of the 1995 
'letters' agreement based on the subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed 
Taylor. The only beneficiary to the priority of payment was Donna Taylor and, as the only 
beneficiary, it was her right to waive and to do so without legal obligation to first obtain the 
consent of AIA. 
(G) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties seeks costs and attorney fees based on LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
The Court denies an award of costs and attorney fees to either party, as the Court finds there is 
no prevailing party and that none of the motions were brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. 
Defendants' Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED only as to Plaintiffs 
claim for unjust enrichment. Defendants' Motion is DENIED as to all other issues. 
16 
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·. Defendants' Motion t0;Disriiiss-is hereby.GRANTED as to PlaintiWs claims for fraud, 
constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. 
· • • • -
0Dated.this _ / { . day. of July 2014. ~ ------
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cumer L- Graen, Esq. 
Green Law Offioes 
P.O. Box 2597 
Boise, ID 82701 
Re: AIA services Corporation/Donna Taylor 
Dear Cumer: 
,,, 
This letter memorial:izes our agreement concerning Bonn-a J. 
'raylor 1s interest in AIA s~rvices Corporation as tha holder of its 
stated Value Preferred stock and in the pending reorganization of 
thte company, including the contribution . of additional capital 
th.rough a private placement to be conducted by J.G. Kinnard and 
Company, :Incorporated. 1, 
1. Effective February 1, ·1995r regardless of thQ outcome of 
the priv-ate placement, tne monthly preferred stock redemption 
payments shall be converi:,Qd from a fi:fteen year amortization at 
prime rate less. 1-1/2% to a ten-year payout at prime rate plus 
1/4%, to confom with the terms of t.ha anticipated nota payment to 
Reed·J. Taylor for redempt.ion -of his common stock. In addition, 
your client will be en-t;itled to accelerate the redemption 
obligation upon lapse of f~fte,m days after default in payment of 
the 'prinoipil'll or iterest. ,, 
. Further, AIA Services" Corporation 1 s note or any note payable 
to Reed J. Taylor tor the $6,000,000 purchase price tor hi•.· common 
ehares will be subordinated to the redemption rights qf ye;,~· client 
so that R$ed J. ~aylo.r wi11 reoe~ve no p.rineip.al payment, on sai~ 
note until Donna Tay;L.cr I s s~oc:k has been c:ompletely ~edeemed. ~ssd 
J. Taylor will rece.ive no interest payia.ents on the. note payable to 
him if payments to Donna Taylor are in default. ShoUld Reed J. 
1'aylor transfer his remaining 113,494 shares of ~tA Services common 
stcok to the Co:,:poration, directly or indirectly or eftecuate a 
reduction or el.iJnination of his note in somQ othQr farahion, Donna 
cra:ylo:r: • s re4emption obligation shall become due and fUlly payable. 
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2. In the interim prior to closing of tha private placement, all 
of your client's existing claims are preserved and discovery may 
oontinue. ArA Services ag~ees to cooperate w.ith you in setting a 
hearing, if the offering i~ ttnsuceessful, within .sixty days after 
termination of tha offering. 
3. .If the private placement is successful, AJ:A Sc.rvicea will pay 
to Donna. Taylor a lump su,m red.emption payment of $700, ooo plus 
$100,000 for professional fees inourrad by your client in pursuing 
her claims to date. In 1addition, to the extent the o~tering 
proceeds exceed the minimUlU offering level o! $5,350 1 000, AIA 
Services will pay your client each dollar of net offering proceeds 
in excess of the minimUltl up to the full amount of the unpaid 
principal balance of the redel!lption price. If thQ offering 
p~oceeds exciead the minimum but do not reach thG maximum, any 
unpaid principal balance of the redemption price will be paid in 
monthly installments based upon the ten-year amortization at prillle 
plus 1/4%. 
~1 
4. Conditioned upon the ;'successful completion of the private 
plaeel'lfent and your client ts receipt of the foregoing paj'ltaents, 
Donna Taylor releas(;!s A'IA Services Corporation and it subsidiaries, 
their respect.i ve officers; directors, shareholders, employees, 
affiliates and. other agents:. in their official c,apacitieef1i:Wfrom/~ll 
,,,tlflfl1I1!!il!IJ1iltli 
does not release Reed. Tayl<?r fndividuallY :from hi&i" obligation to 
Donna Taylor arising from . ·said divorce action. Further, Donna 
Taylor's :rights and proteci;ions as a preferred shareholde.r which 
are sat forth in the Amen4~d Articles of Incorporation shall be 
preserve(l. In addition, $ubject to the same conditionst Donna 
Taylor consents to I and agre.es that she will not aasert disc.enter' a 
rights in connection with ~i1 corporate transactions necessary to 
effectuate the private placement, including (without li1dta.tion) 
al!lendment . of the corporation's Articles of :tncorporatl<>n to 
authorize tbe creation of the necessary preferred stock and 
warrants; the issuance of such securities to the private .plao~ment 
investors, the Agency Agreement with J. G. ~innard and Company, 
Incorpora.ted and the conduct of the p~iva~e placement in accordance 
therewith, the U5e of the proposed Confid,ntial :Private Placement 
Memorandum representing ~at your client has consented to .all such 
trans.actions, the mezver of :Rich Campanaro •·s Delaware. corporation 
into AU services corporat~o~ and all other actions necessary to 
achieve the capital s~ct~e .(as of the closing of the private 
placement) refl.eoted ~n ~' Private Plao~ant Memorandum. suoh 
corporate transactions will not be allowed to l)ecome eftec::tive 
unless th~ offering is succe$sful; and therefore, your client sha·ll 
. ' 
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r.,:;;t:. '1nive a.nr right• ot ~• p.r~j\\~ioc:w. by h-c.r t1on~ont to, ~nd wA:1.Vur 
of di~a6ntA~'• r1g~tG in CQnnQction vith thQae t~anaaat.ions. 
tt the ccrpo~ation QQmpl~t•ll redeem• yQu~ olie~t'• pr~f•rred 
~ock, ocnna ~~y~or complct9ly relaa~ea AJ:A services c~~oration 
t1.nd $.:ta c.ull•idi«:c-ie~, th.Gil:- .rupeotiv• effioers1 dit'&otora,. 
~har~hol~ars, ~loy&es, ~tfiliatas ffn~ O'thQ~ &g~ttta, and ~e~d J, 
~~y1or ~a 4n it~ivid\U.l; trom &ll claim,, 
!t~ thl~ l.e&ttcir 1.ocm.~~-\:Qly 1tatias -cur t\greem'1rtt, ~l.~so eign 
and obtain ycu: cl1ont 1~ si;nttura bsl~~ and fa~ e copy ct this 
:fUJ..1.t axtdtit•d lo.ttor to u.e: e.e •oon aa ~01111ibla. :tb11:l.• Darlin and 
yot:1, wil1 JUUtU.&lly p~tpare a draft 'ct a do.t~itiva &1att.l.eine.nt 
aqraam«nt i~~orpor«tihg ths to~egoi~g tarma ~nd ~ther dooument• 
neQta•a.ry to etiaotu.t, th~ t•t,i:1Q ot ~ia 1gr•~~~nt, 
. . " 
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: ( 425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
DONNA J. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TA \'LOR; CONNIE 
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK; 
and MICHAEL W. CASHMAN, SR., 
Defendants. 
Case No.: C V 1 3 Q 1 0 / 5 
COMPLAINT 
Category: A 
Fee: $96.00 
,JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiff Donna J. Taylor, by and through her attorney of record, submits this Complaint 
alleging and, to the extent necessary, pleading in the alternative as follows: 
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
. ' 
1. Plaintiff Donna J. Taylor ("Donna Taylor") is a resident of Clarkston, Asotin 
County, Washington. 
2. Defendant AIA Services Corporation (AIA Services Corporation, together with its 
past and present subsidiaries are collectively referred to as "AIA Services") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal offices located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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3. Defendant R. John Taylor ("John Taylor") is an individual residing in Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. John Taylor has been a member of the board of directors of AIA 
Services since it was founded. 
4. Defendant Connie Taylor Henderson ("Connie Taylor") is an individual residing 
in the state of Washington. 
5. Defendant James Beck ("Beck") is an individual residing m the state of 
Minnesota, who transacts business in Idaho. 
6. Defendant Michael W. Cashman, Sr. ("Cashman") is an individual residing in the 
state of Minnesota, who transacts business in Idaho. 
7. Cashman, Beck, Connie Taylor and John Taylor are collectively referred to in this 
Complaint as the "individual defendants". When Donna Taylor refers to the foregoing 
"individual defendants" in this Complaint, she is alleging that more than two or more or all of the 
"individual defendants". 
8. Damages in this action exceed $10,000 and the defendants conduct business 
and/or reside in Nez Perce County, Idaho. Jurisdiction and venue are appropriate in Nez Perce 
County District Court. See e.g., LC.§ 5-404; LC. §5-514. 
9. This is not a derivative action and Donna Taylor will not be asserting any 
derivative claims in this lawsuit.1 Donna Taylor is asserting the direct claims and requested relief 
in this lawsuit strictly for her own personal benefit, as the Series A Preferred Shareholder of AIA 
Services. To the extent that Donna Taylor _is successful in obtaining personal liability from the 
1 Donna Taylor has a pending derivative lawsuit in United States District Court in Idaho under Case No. 
1: 1 O-cv-00404-MLB. Although she will continue to attempt pursue derivative claims in that lawsuit, the case has 
been presently stayed pending the resolution of Taylor v. Riley, et al., a wholly unrelated case wherein Reed Taylor 
is pursuing negligence based claims against the authors of an opinion letter given to 'Reed Taylor in connection with 
the illegal purchase of his shares in AIA Services. See Taylor v. Riley, 2012 WL 7985412. That lawsuit will not 
resolve any of the claims or issues subject to this lawsuit nor will it recovery any money for AIA Services or its 
minatory shareholders. 
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individual defendants in this lawsuit, she will be benefiting the innocent minority shareholders of 
AIA Services and participants of the AIA Services 40l(k) Plan-all of whom have been cheated 
out of their fair share of the corporate assets, opportunities and funds by and through the 
defendants' acts and omissions. 
10. AIA Services, by and through the individual defendants, initiated a lawsuit 
against Donna Taylor and thirteen other shareholders of AIA Services in Nez Perce County 
District Court under Case No. CV-12-01483. Judge Kerrick dismissed that lawsuit wherein he 
ruled that the fourteen shareholders of AIA Services had complied with Idaho Code when they 
objected to the reverse stock split sought by AIA Services (which was really sought, upon 
information and belief, by and through the individual defendants). Judge Kerrick ruled that 
issues pertaining to the amount owed to Donna Taylor for her Series A Preferred Shares should 
be determined in the case Donna Taylor v. John Taylor, et al., Nez Perce County District Court 
Case No. CV-08-01150. 
11. Based upon Judge Kerrick's order granting summary judgment to the defendants 
in CV-12-01483 (one of whom was Donna Taylor), Donna Taylor will move to consolidate this 
lawsuit with Nez Perce County District Court Case No. CV-08-01150 (AIA Services, Beck and 
Cashman are not parties to that lawsuit). 
IT. FACTUALBACKGROUND 
A. Background On Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares. 
12. On December 14, 1987, Reed and Donna Taylor executed the Property Settlement 
Agreement for their divorce. Under the terms of that Agreement, Reed and Donna Taylor 
contributed their controlling interest in AIA Insurance, Inc. and other entities to AIA Services in 
exchange for 200,000 Series A Preferred Shares and 5,963 additional common shares in AIA 
COMPLAINT - 3 
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Services. Under the terms of Reed and Donna Taylor's Property Settlement Agreement, the 
200,000 Series A Preferred Shares were transferred to Donna Taylor. 
13. On December 29, 1987, AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation were 
filed with the Idaho Secretary of State to protect the rights and interests of the Series A Preferred 
Shareholders (which was and only has been Donna Taylor) and to impose restrictions upon AIA 
Services. 
14. On December 2, 1993, Donna Taylor exercised her right to require her Series A 
Preferred Shares to be purchased; however, AIA Services elected to purchase her shares at the 
price of $10 per share over 15 years with interest to accrue at the prime rate minus one and one-
half percent (1.5%). 
15. On January 11, 1995, AIA Services agreed to accelerate the purchase of Donna 
Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares by purchasing them over 10 years, with an upward 
adjustment to the interest rate of prime interest rate plus one-quarter percent (prime plus .25%). 
That Agreement was authorized by, and AIA Services was authorized to use capital surplus to 
purchase Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares as provided in LC. § 30-1-6, AIA Services 
Amended Articles of Incorporation. 
16. On March 22, 1995, Cumer Green, on behalf of Donna Taylor, and Richard Riley, 
on behalf of AIA Services, confirmed that Donna Taylor's shares would be redeemed on that 
ten-year amortization schedule, or 107 more payments commencing on February 1, 1995. This 
confirmed that under the terms of the January 11, 1995 Agreement Donna Taylor's Series A 
Preferred Shares were required to be purchased no later than on or before December 1, 2003. 
17. On July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995, respectively, AIA Services and Donna 
Taylor agreed to other modified terms, although none of the modifications changed the ten-year 
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amortization period or interest rate agreed to in the January 11, 1995 Agreement. 
18. Almost one year later, on July 1, 1996, Donna Taylor and AIA Services executed 
the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement 
was drafted by AIA Services' counsel. Donna Taylor was not represented by counsel at that 
time. Under the terms of that Agreement, AIA Services confirmed that it would continue to 
purchase Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares in accordance with the January 11, 1995 
Agreement and AIA Services further agreed to accelerate payments to Donna Taylor through the 
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement by paying her an additional $100,000 every six 
months after Reed Taylor's $1.5 million down payment note was paid (which was paid in full in 
2001), but she never received a single additional $100,000 payment as required. 
19. On February 21, 2008, John Taylor testified that Donna Taylor was owed 
$443,478.47 in principal on her Series A Preferred Shares. On June 24, 2008, John Taylor wrote 
to Donna Taylor advising her that payments would be suspended to her. John Taylor admitted 
that the payments were suspended in retaliation for her filing a lawsuit against him for a personal 
guarantee ofover $100,000 of the sums owed to her. 
20. Despite Donna Taylor allowing AIA Services, John Taylor and Connie Taylor 
almost five years to pay her since the last payment, Donna Taylor has not received a payment 
since May 30, 2008. On February 11, 2013, Donna Taylor wrote to AIA Services demanding 
payment in full, providing notice of acceleration and advising that she would not consent to the 
purchase of any common shares. Donna Taylor received no response to that letter and no 
payments were made by AIA Services. 
21. The amount due to her as of June 6, 2013 is at least $492,346.54. The amount 
owed is governed by and confirmed through the unambiguous Series A Preferred Shareholder 
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Agreement, and, to the extent that Agreement is successfully challenged, Donna Taylor's 
contractual rights revert back to previously executed Agreements, including the January 11, 1995 
Agreement. 
22. AIA Services and the individual defendants are expected to assert that the 
Agreements that they engineered and approved requiring the purchase of Donna Taylor's shares 
were illegal because the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal (the purchase that the 
individual defendants engineered and effectuated through AIA Services) and that Donna 
Taylor's rights revert back to the Amended Articles of Incorporation. Under this theory, AIA 
Services has already asserted that Donna Taylor is owed at least approximately $82,000. Thus, 
there is no dispute that Donna Taylor is owed a significant sum of money under any theory. 
23. Despite numerous demands for payment, AIA Services and the individual 
defendants have refused to pay her the sums owed to purchase her remaining Series A Shares as 
required. 
24. Despite having not paid Donna Taylor, AIA Services and the individual 
defendants have conspired to transfer millions of dollars from AIA Services for their benefit. For 
example, in recent years AIA Services has loaned Pacific Empire Radio Corporation (an entity 
partially owned and controlled by John Taylor and Connie Taylor) over $700,000 when such 
loans were barred by AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation and engaged in other 
acts discussed below. 
25. AIA Services and the individual defendants have intentionally and blatantly 
refused to complete the purchase of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares as required. AIA 
Services and the individual defendants have intentionally and blatantly acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, maliciously, and in complete disregard for Donna Taylor's contractual rights and the 
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provisions under AIA Services' Articles oflncorporation which were enacted to protect her. 
B. Background On the Operation of AIA Services and Unlawful Acts. 
26. From 1995 through the present time, John Taylor and Connie Taylor were 
majority shareholders of AIA Services' common shares. 
27. From 1995 through the present time, John Taylor has been President and a 
director of AIA Services. As an officer and direct of AIA Services, John Taylor owes elevated 
fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor. John Taylor is a shareholder or part owner of at least one 
Idaho entity that has been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully 
derived from AIA Services and/or its subsidiaries. 
28. From 2007 to the present time, Connie Taylor has been a member of the board of 
directors of AJA Services. Connie Taylor is a co-owner of shares in AIA Services with John 
Taylor. Connie Taylor is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has been the 
recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AJA Services 
and/or its subsidiaries. 
29. From 2007 through the present time, Beck has been a member of the board of 
directors of AIA Services. Beck was previously on the board of AJA Services for several years 
starting in 1995. Beck is or has purported to have been a shareholder of AIA Services from at 
least 1995 through 2012. Beck is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has 
been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AIA 
Services. 
30. Cashman was previously on the board of AIA Services for several years starting 
in 1995. Cashman is or has purported to have been a shareholder of AIA Services from at least 
1995. through 2012. Cashman is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has 
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been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AIA 
Services. 
31. While they were shareholders and/or directors of AIA Services, John Taylor, 
Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman owned interests in other entities that received money, loans, 
services, trade secrets and other assets from AIA Services in violation of their fiduciary duties 
and in violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles ofinc;orporation and Bylaws. 
32. During times in which Beck, Cashman and/or Connie Taylor were not members 
of the board of directors, they were involved with, or aided in, making decisions for AIA 
Services and/or acquiesced in decisions made by others, including John Taylor. 
33. From 1995 through the present time, the individual defendants have unlawfully 
operated AIA Services for their benefit, failed to comply with AIA Services' Restated Bylaws, 
failed to comply with AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation, failed to conduct 
annual shareholder meetings, failed to provide full disclosure to shareholders and have operated 
AIA Service in complete disregard of its corporate structure. 
34. In 1995, the individual defendants desired to redeem Reed Taylor's shares to 
obtain control of AIA and bring in a new management team to shift AIA Services' focus to 
selling other products. To carry out this new plan, the individual defendants sought to purchase 
Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services through a leveraged stock redemption. 
3 5. The individual defendants entered into a voting agreement to ensure that they 
maintained control over AIA Services. 
36. In a 1995, John Taylor and Connie Taylor (both attorneys licensed to practice law 
from 1995 through the present time) became the majority shareholders in AIA Services. 
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37. Since obtaining operational and financial control of AIA Services in 1995, the 
individual defendants liave engaged in the following unlawful acts in disregard of AIA Services' 
corporate structure, its Amended Articles of Incorporation, Restated Bylaws and }lfoper and 
lawful corporate governance: (a) ownership of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") 
was transferred from AIA Services; (b) AIA Services subsidized CropUSA and other entities; (c) 
none of John Taylor's compensation was allocated to CropUSA; (d) there was over $500,000 of 
identified expenses paid by AIA Services that were never allocated or billed to CropUSA; (e) 
CropUSA was capitalized with over $1.5 Million cash from AIA Services in just one of many 
transfers of assets; (f) AIA Services guaranteed a $15 Million loan for CropUSA for no 
consideration; (g) CropUSA's sale of $10 Million in assets that were derived from AIA Services; 
(h) AIA Services purchased over $400,000 of shares in Pacific Empire Radio Corp. ("PERC") 
and then transferred those shares to John Taylor and Connie Taylor; (i) AIA Services transferred 
a $95,000 receivable owed by PERC to CropUSA; (k) AIA Services has loaned PERC over 
$700,000 in recent years in violation of AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation; (1) AIA 
Services has provided labor and services at no cost for other entities owned by the individual 
defendants; (m) AIA Services has paid millions of dollars in excessive compensation to John 
Taylor ancj. Connie Taylor in exchange for receiving nothing in return; (n) AIA Services was 
illegally paying millions of dollars to present and former common shareholders to purchase their 
shares and/or make payments on those purchases; ( o) John Taylor and Connie Taylor purchased 
a parking lot, using AIA's line-of-credit, and promptly increased the $5,000 yearly rent paid by 
AIA Services.to $15,000 per year; (p) AJA Services purchased vehicles from John Taylor; (q) 
attempt to effectuate a reverse stock split and termination of the ESOP to eliminate those . 
shareholders in violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation; and (r) engaged 
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in other acts and/or omissions that were illegal, unlawful and/or violated AIA Services' Articles 
of Incorporation and Restated Bylaws. 
38. Many of the acts and omissions set forth in the foregoing paragraph occurred 
during times in which AIA Services was not current on its obligations to Donna Taylor. 
39. By their own admissions, the individual defendants have operated AIA Services 
for their own benefit with complete disregard for AIA Services' corporate structure and the 
interests of the Series A Preferred Shareholder. 
40. After taking millions of dollars from AIA Services, the individual defendants now 
seek to deprive Donna Taylor of the sums rightfully owed to her. Under the circumstances of this 
case, the individual defendants should be liable for all sums owed by AIA Services under the 
doctrines of alter-ego and piercing the corporate veil. 
41. However, even if AIA Services and the individual defendants are successful in 
reducing the amount owed to Donna Taylor, the individual defendants are liable for · the 
difference based upon their breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duties and/or unjust enrichment for improperly operating AIA Services to deprive Donna Taylor 
of the sums rightfully owed to her. To this day, the individual defendants could have and should 
have taken all necessary corporate acts to comply with AIA Services' obligations to Donna 
Taylor. 
42. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
(Against AIA Services Only) 
Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action. 
43. AIA Services owed Donna Taylor contractual obligations under the Series A 
Preferred Shareholder Agreement and/or the previously executed Agreements (including the 
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January 11, 1995 Agreement) and/or AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation to 
purchase and/or redeem Donna Taylor Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services and make 
certain payments to her and other obligations. AIA Services has breached its contractual 
obligations owed to Donna Taylor, including, without limitation, the obligations to timely pay 
her and to purchase and/or redeem her shares. 
44. AIA Services, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor were and are 
required to comply with AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation and owe Donna 
Taylor contractual obligations to comply with the Amended Articles of Incorporation; and they 
have breached those contractual obligations by, among other things, loaning money to other 
parties, attempting to or taking corporate action in violation of AIA Services' in violation of 
those Articles and failing to appoint Donna Taylor's. designee to the Board of AIA Services. 
45. As a direct and/or proximate result of foregoing breaches, Donna Taylor has been 
damaged, and, is therefore entitled to judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be 
proven at or before trial. Donna Taylor also requests specific performance and/or injunctive 
relief of AIA Services' obligations. 
IV. SECOND OF ACTION - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
(Against Individual Defendants Only). 
46. Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action. 
47. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor owe and/or owed fiduciary 
duties to Donna Taylor, which include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty to deal in good faith. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor have breached 
their fiduciary duties owed to Donna Taylor. 
COMPLAINT - 11 
I 
I 
i 
21 
48. As a direct and/or proximate result of Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie 
Taylor's acts and/or omissions, Donna Taylor has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to 
judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be proven at or before trial. 
V. TIIlRD CAUSE OF ACTION -AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
(Against Individual Defendants Only) 
49. Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained Ln 
other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action. 
50. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor have intentionally aided, 
assisted, covered up, and encouraged the individual defendants and/or other parties in breading 
their fiduciary duties owed to Donna Taylor. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie 
Taylor's acts and/or omissions constitute aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties of 
other parties, including the individual defendants. 
51. As a direct and/or proximate result of Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie 
Taylor's acts and/or omissions, Donna Taylor has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to 
judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be proven at or before trial. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(Against Individual Defendants Only) 
52. Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action. 
53. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor have been conferred the benefit 
by Donna Taylor of obtaining operational and financial control over AIA Services. Through that 
conferred benefit, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor have looted AIA Services to 
their benefit and to the detriment of Donna Taylor. It would be unjust to allow Beck, Cashman, 
John Taylor and Connie Taylor to retain the benefits without justly compensating Donna Taylor. 
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As a result, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor liable to Donna Taylor under the 
theory ofunjust enrichment. 
54. As a direct and/or proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of Beck, 
Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor, they have been unjustly enriched and Donna Taylor 
has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount 
to be proven at or before trial. 
VII.FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION -DECLARATORY RELIEF/SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE 
55. Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action. 
56. Donna Taylor requests a declaratory judgment and/or specific performance 
against the defendants, to the extent necessary, to grant her the relief requested in this Complaint 
(including, without limitation, a declaratory judgment ordering the defendants to comply with 
AIA Services' Bylaws, Amended Articles of Incorporation (and to rescind/revoke/void 
unlawfully filed Amendments thereto and any stock purchases made in violation of the Amended 
Articles of Incorporation), contractual obligations, and to compel the purchase of Donna Taylor's 
remaining Series A Preferred Shares) and/or such relief as may be requested at or before trial. 
VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Donna Taylor prays for the following relief: 
1. For a judgment against AIA Services for all sums owed to Donna Taylor in an 
amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest; 
2. For a judgment against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman, jointly 
and severally, in an amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment 
interest; 
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3. For judgment against AIA Services compelling it to purchase and/or redeem 
Donna Taylor's remaining Series A Preferred Shares; 
4. For judgment against the individual defendants compelling them to purchase 
and/or redeem Donna Taylor's remaining Series A Preferred Shares; 
5. For a judgment finding that John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman are 
the alter-egos of AIA Services, its subsidiaries and/or that their corporate veil should be pierced 
requiring John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman to be personally liable for all sums 
and damages owed by AIA Services to Donna Taylor and for judgment to be entered against 
them in the amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest; 
6. For a judgment barring AIA Services, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie 
Taylor from effectuating a reverse stock split, voiding the termination of the ESOP and voiding 
the Amending Articles oflncorporation filed on July 17, 2013; 
7. For a judgment of any other declaratory relief requested and/or contemplated by 
the allegations in this Complaint and/or otherwise sought or requested at or before trial based 
upon the facts and circumstances of this case; 
8. For a preliminary and permanent injunction against AIA Services, Beck, 
Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor barring them from effectuating a reverse stock split 
until this lawsuit has concluded and all sums owed to Donna Taylor for her Series A Preferred 
Shares have been paid in full; 
9. For a preliminary and permanent injunction seeking any temporary relief 
requested by Donna Taylor based upon the facts and circumstances of this case; 
10. For an award of prejudgment interest based upon the statutory rate of 12% · 
because the Agreements requiring the purchase of Donna Taylor's shares do not specify an 
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interest rate after the obligations matured; 
11. For an award of compound interest because sums have been intentionally, 
vexatiously and maliciously withheld from Donna Taylor; 
12. For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho 
Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and 
13. For such other relief that Donna Taylor may request at or before trial and/or such 
relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2013. 
OFFICE, PLLC 
IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Donna J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all claims and 
damages so triable. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2013. 
FFICE,PLLC 
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Pavmets to Reed and Donna 
ComparecUo OJ)erating ln<:ome 
9130/2008 
AIA Insurance 
Net Income 
1995 (1,;,00,419) 
1995 757,591 
1997 828Jl54 
199B 877;318 
1999 (5,061) 
.2000 313,655 
2001 354,730 
2002 451,233 
2003 750,012 
2004 1,063-,!$20 
2005 239,660 
2006 230.432 
2007 71,881 
200a 174,251 
4,607,657 
Un-Consoild.ated 
AIA Service~ 
Net Income iotal Income 
{724,080) (2,224,499) 
(258,836) 498,,755 
(359,739) 469,115 
{910,219) (32,901) 
(793,738) (798,799) 
(531,963) (216,:308) 
(593,414) (238,684) 
1354,658) 96,575 
(411,941.) 336,071 
(469,475) 594,045 
{390,380) (150,720) 
(534.4751 (3~.043} 
(519,459) (447,578) 
(657:296) {483,045) 
{7,609,Gn) (2,902,016} 
A value of a,rplanes (~greed value per msurance policy) 
B write off.ot personatAR 
C ·salary 
D legal bills. Caimcross & Hempeimann 
E write off CAP BUt 
F payment of Fells Field Airplane bill 
G. cost of protected agents 9/30/08 
Cash Payments 
to Reed 
583,065 
590,060 
905,680 
958,094 
918,766 
707,692 
353,052 
172,520 
221,948 
275.932 
30t148 
"245.999 
277,426 
61.066 
6,592,648 
*Amount 
H Misc. expenses: personal" expenses. peterson consulting, and retainer 
Other Pa~men~ Payments 
to Reed Tola! io Re,ecf to Donna Grand Total 
A i.321.006 * 1,904.065 351,894 2,255,960 
B 469,996 469,996 46!l,J;l96 
G 240,000 240.000 240,000 
590,060 320,919 910,979 
C 140,000 140,00Q 140,000 
D 96,065 96,065 9li,06~ 
E 309,083 309,083 3'09.,083 
F 15,963 15.$163 1$.963 
G 48.8,473 4S8.473 488,473 
90S,1;!80 293,467 1,199,341 
958,094 29'3,985 1,252,079 
s1a-.tsa 289.826 1,206,592 
7.07.692 295,820 1,003,512 
35~.062 57,677 410,729 
172,520 47,850 220,37.0 
221,948 4a,oo·o 261).948 
275.932 90,000 365,932 
301.148 120,000 421,148 
245,999 120.ocio 365,999-
277,426 120,0QO 397,426 
H :l6,138 117,204, 55,000 172,204 
3,116,718 9,708,367 2,504,439 12,213,805 
of assumed liability is $672,339.85 
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